into the open, where they could be annihi-
lated by superior Japanese forces. However,
both he and Nagumo were unaware that the
United States had broken the Japanese naval
code—and Adm. Frank J. Fletcher was aware
of all pending developments. On June 4, 1942,
American aircraft stationed at Midway at-
tacked the Japanese fleet but were shot down
without scoring a hit. Nagumo then ordered
an air strike against the offending island’s air-
field and facilities, inflicting great damage. A
second wave was requested, and the admiral,
mindful of earlier criticism of his caution at
Pearl Harbor, consented to a second strike.
However, this entailed disarming Japanese
aircraft previously armed with torpedoes for
antiship operations and refitting them with
bombs. While this complex change was under
way, American dive-bombers suddenly ap-
peared overhead. In the course of five min-
utes they sank three of Nagumo’s carriers,
then returned the following day to finish off
the survivor. Losses of such magnitude crip-
pled the Japanese fleet, and the planned inva-
sion of Midway was canceled. Nagumo then
sullenly returned home under the specter of
defeat. Midway proved a strategic disaster of
the first magnitude, for the United States now
seized the initiative. Nagumo was also pri-
vately criticized for indecision and errors of
judgment prior to the battle and for his over-
all handling of his command. Nonetheless, he
was retained in high rank out of respect for
seniority.
Nagumo, still commanding carriers, next
saw action throughout the bloody Guadal-
canal campaign. On August 24, 1942, his air-
craft roughly handled an American flotilla in
the Second Battle of the Solomon Sea, but he
lost the small carrier Ryujo.On October 26,
1942, Nagumo’s airmen again lashed enemy
forces in the Battle of Santa Cruz, sinking the
American carrier USS Hornetbut also sus-
taining heavy losses. After this last engage-
ment, the High Command had grown impa-
tient with Nagumo’s fumbling and removed
him from carrier duty. Thereafter, he ac-
cepted a series of minor base commands
throughout Japan. In the later part of 1943, he
was entrusted to lead the 6,000-man garrison
on Saipan, in the Marianas, which he pre-
pared against an impending Allied assault.
This materialized on June 15, 1944, and the
Americans slowly subdued the Japanese for-
tifications at great cost to both sides. By July
6, 1944, Nagumo and his staff were holed up
in a cave, awaiting death. At that point the ad-
miral took out a pistol and killed himself
rather than submit to the humiliation of cap-
ture. On December 12, 1944, this curiously
timid, inefficient figure was posthumously
promoted to full admiral.Bibliography
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