to do next. He lacked sufficient supplies to at-
tempt a forced march around the American
line—which in any event would have dragged
him deeper into the swampland. The morale
of his command was also suffering due to in-
activity and defeat. He finally settled upon the
simple, but highly dangerous, tactical expedi-
ent of frontally assaulting a prepared position,
fully manned. To this end, he received a final
reinforcement of 2,000 men under Gen. John
Lambert and prepared an elaborate offensive
scheme.
Despite all evidence to the contrary, Pak-
enham still believed his men were far supe-
rior to the Americans in the open, confident of
victory if he could only close with them. He
therefore selected to employ four infantry
columns to simultaneously hit Jackson’s line
at various points. All were equipped with scal-
ing ladders for the purpose of mounting the
barricades; if any one of them penetrated the
American line, the general felt assured that
the enemy would bolt. As added insurance in
this risky venture, he directed Col. William
Thornton to ferry part of his command across
the Mississippi and storm the American bat-
teries located there. Once in British posses-
sion, these cannons could be turned against
Jackson’s right flank and provide a deadly en-
filade fire. But timing was crucial: Pakenham
instructed Thornton that he must capture the
guns quickly before the main assault could be
delivered or disaster might result. Yet both
commanders, long accustomed to danger and
a stiff fight, felt that their prospects for suc-
ceeding were good.
On the fateful foggy morning of January 7,
1815, Thornton put his command in motion.
However, he was inadvertently delayed sev-
eral hours owing to the low level of the river;
by the time he successfully stormed Gen.
John Adair’s position, the main British main
attack had been under way for some time. In
truth, Pakenham’s ill-conceived and overly
complicated plan fell apart at the onset. The
fog was so dense that troops could not deploy
with precision and—when it suddenly lifted—
marksmen under Gen. William Carroll and
gunners under the pirate Jean Lafitte com-
menced a heavy, incessant stream of fire upon
them. The densely packed British formations
wilted from heavy casualties and could make
no headway. Pakenham, aghast at their confu-
sion, bravely galloped to the front and urged
them on. He was almost immediately stunned
by a cannonball that knocked him off his
horse. Quickly remounting, he dashed in
among his troops yelling, “Shame! Shame! Re-
member, you’re British! Forward, gentlemen,
forward!” Suddenly two bullets slammed into
the general’s chest. More dead than alive, Pak-
enham was propped against a tree by several
aides and issued his final orders for General
Lambert—to commit the reserves. Lambert,
observing the disaster unfolding before him
with horror, assumed command and called off
the attack. Wellington’s Invincibles, victorious
on so many a far-flung field, had bloodily
stumbled on a Louisiana bayou—at the hands
of fighting men they despised.
Pakenham’s desperate gambit was also an
outright disaster. In less than an hour the
British lost 2,000 splendid troops—to an
American tally of only 13! Pakenham and his
second in command, Gen. Samuel Gibbs,
were among the slain, as were scores of high-
ranking regimental officers. Worst of all,
within days Lambert received news of the
Treaty of Ghent on Christmas Eve that ended
the War of 1812. The slaughter had been un-
necessary! The British army, though stag-
gered by such losses, was still potentially dan-
gerous, so Jackson prudently allowed them to
withdraw unmolested. They took along Pak-
enham’s body, preserved in a barrel of rum,
for eventual burial at St. Paul’s Cathedral in
London.Bibliography
Barthrop, Michael. Wellington’s Generals.London: Os-
prey, 1978; Carter, Samuel. Blaze of Glory: The Fight
for New Orleans.New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1971;
Elting, John R. Amateurs to Arms! A Military His-
tory of the War of 1812.Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1991; Fleming, Thomas. “NewPAKENHAM, EDWARD