ators after the aborted
February 26, 1936, coup.
He was consequently re-
warded with a promotion
to the staff of the Kwan-
tung Army. There Tojo
skillfully used his high
visibility and political
acumen to gather support
for his own brand of mili-
tant nationalism. This be-
came known as the Man-
churian faction, which
reiterated the call for Jap-
anese domination of Asia
as well as the conquest of
China for badly needed
natural resources. When
fighting erupted at Bei-
jing in July 1937, Tojo
acted decisively, leading
two brigades on a light-
ning conquest of Inner
Mongolia. Furthermore,
once presiding Gen. Ishihara Kanji began
pressing for a peaceful solution to the war,
Tojo worked diligently to arrange his ouster.
By 1938, he had become the most influential
officer of the Kwantung Army and a major
force in national politics.
In May 1938, Tojo’s political standing was
confirmed when Prime Minister Prince Fumi-
maro Konoe appointed him army vice minister.
His adroitness and sharp personality while in
office quickly gained him the nickname “Razor”
(Kamisori). True to form, Tojo vociferously op-
posed army chief of staff Tada Shun, who
sought peace negotiations with China. He also
agitated for expanded war on the Asian main-
land, as well as confrontation with the Soviet
Union. The onset of World War II in Europe
only accelerated Tojo’s rise to prominence. In
September 1940, he became a vocal proponent
of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Adolf
Hitler, and Benito Mussoliniand also sup-
ported the acquisition of Indochina following
the defeat of France. He then ominously
negated Japan’s commitment to the Interna-
tional Convention Agree-
ment of 1909, which pro-
tected the rights of prison-
ers of war. Tojo also
sought to stifle dissent and
instill greater domestic
harmony by absorbing all
political parties into the
Imperial Rule Assistance
Association. By now
Prince Konoe realized that
Tojo’s machinations were
inching the country to-
ward war, but he was too
popular a figure to dis-
miss. Therefore, in July
1941 he had no recourse
but to retain the fiery gen-
eral as his army minister.
Japan’s aggressive be-
havior in Asia strained re-
lations with the United
States. High-ranking offi-
cials of the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy, never at ease with their army
counterparts, cast the Americans as a much
greater potential adversary than the Soviet
Union, which in any case was being invaded
by German forces. Tojo, erring once in assess-
ing an enemy, temporarily relaxed his stance
toward Russia. He now viewed conflict with
the Western democracies as inevitable.
Konoe, alarmed that he was losing control of
events, staunchly opposed going to war. Tojo
was prepared for such reticence and arranged
for his dismissal. In October 1941, Tojo’s polit-
ical fortunes crested when he became Japan’s
prime minister while also retaining his previ-
ous post as army minister.
Throughout the late fall of 1941, Tojo al-
lowed last-minute negotiations with the
United States to avert war. Previously, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, angered by Japa-
nese aggression in China and its occupation
of Indochina, enacted an economic embargo.
This deprived Japan of badly needed natural
resources such as oil and steel to run its econ-
omy and—more important—its military. Fur-TOJO, HIDEKI
Hideki Tojo
Bettmann/Corbis