America\'s Military Adversaries. From Colonial Times to the Present

(John Hannent) #1

aerial attack upon Taranto, Italy, which sank
large portions of the Italian fleet at anchor.
This single act vindicated his view of naval
aviation. Moreover, the prevailing military
opinion was that, once the Japanese had es-
tablished a defensive perimeter in the Pacific,
American attacks would prove so costly that
a favorable peace treaty was inevitable. How-
ever, Yamamoto, a somber realist, did not sub-
scribe to such optimism and warned superi-
ors that there was no margin for error. He also
foresaw that his forces might enjoy up to six
months of interrupted victory—after which
he promised nothing. To his mind, Japan
could not compete with the natural resources
and industrial capacity of the United States,
especially in a protracted conflict. Unfortu-
nately, such dire predictions rebounded off
the new prime minister, Hideki Tojo, and in
the fall of 1941 he authorized Yamamoto to
prepare for war. “What a strange position I
find myself in now,” the admiral confided,
“having to make a decision diametrically op-
posed to my own personal opinion, with no
choice but to push full speed in pursuance of
that decision.” In late November, a Japanese
strike force of four carriers and other vessels
under Adm. Chuichi Nagumosteamed out of
home waters in complete secrecy and under
complete radio silence. They headed east to-
ward the Hawaii Islands.
On December 7, 1941, Nagumo’s carriers
launched Cmdr. Mitsuo Fuchidaand 180 air-
craft in the first wave. The first attack against
Pearl Harbor was entirely successful, as was
the second wave. The Americans suffered
four battleships destroyed and four heavily
damaged, but the critical target—three U.S.
Navy aircraft carriers—were absent during
the attack. The Japanese High Command was
nonetheless jubilant, and the Japanese Impe-
rial Navy went on to achieve equally impres-
sive victories in the Philippines, Dutch East
Indies, and Indian Ocean. However, Ya-
mamoto’s solemn predictions suddenly hit
home when Col. James H. Doolittle led a sur-
prise air raid against Tokyo in April 1942. The
following month, Japanese carriers also


fought history’s first air-to-ship battle at the
Battle of the Coral Sea. This was a tactical vic-
tory for Japan but also a strategic defeat, for
the impending invasion of New Guinea was
called off. These twin reverses convinced se-
nior Japanese leaders to expand their already
large defensive perimeter to preclude such at-
tacks in the future.
In June 1942, Yamamoto conceived and di-
rected Operation MI, the capture of Midway
Island. The target itself was militarily inconse-
quential, but he hoped to bait the three U.S.
carriers out into the open where they could
be destroyed. A huge fleet of four Japanese
aircraft carriers and several hundred war-
ships advanced upon the quarry. Unknown to
Yamamoto, U.S. code breakers could read his
messages and were alerted to his intentions.
Admirals Raymond H. Spruance and Frank J.
Fletcher then deployed their forces northeast
of Midway, and a gigantic naval ambush un-
folded. By the time the smoke cleared on June
4, 1942, Yamamoto had lost all four of his best
carriers, along with hundreds of skilled avia-
tors. He can certainly be faulted for devising
such an overly complex scheme, but Midway
did not diminish his national standing. De-
spite the stigma of defeat, the admiral contin-
ued directing the naval war effort.
Midway proved a turning point, for the
strategic initiative passed to the United
States, enabling it to assume offensive opera-
tions. Within two months, the First Marine Di-
vision landed at Guadalcanal in the Solomon
Islands, triggering a costly internecine strug-
gle that drained Japan’s military assets. As Ya-
mamoto predicted, his forces were hard-
pressed to counter the steady influx of new
American vessels and aircraft reaching the
theater. To boost morale, the admiral decided
to visit numerous Japanese bases in the re-
gion. American code breakers became ap-
prised of this fact, thus allowing the United
States to lay another trap—this time in the air.
On April 18, 1943, a flight of 12 Lockheed P-38
Lightnings departed Guadalcanal for Bou-
gainville on a top-secret mission, appropri-
ately labeledOperation Vengeance. Flying 30

YAMAMOTO, ISOROKU

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