reconstruction at home
and confrontation with
the Soviet Union. This
contrasted sharply with
Tojo’s Control faction,
which pushed for expan-
sion on the Asian main-
land. Tensions crested in
February 1936 when the
Young Officers’ Revolt,
an aborted Imperial Way
coup, tried to overthrow
the civilian government.
Yamashita was never im-
plicated in the plot,
which he helped to sup-
press, but his prior asso-
ciation resulted in exile
to Korea as a brigade
commander. However,
his reputation as an ex-
cellent soldier could not
keep political enemies from preventing his
promotion to major general in 1937. But by
1940, Tojo had maneuvered himself into be-
coming prime minister. He quickly perceived
Yamashita as a potential rival and dispatched
him on a lengthy inspection tour of war-torn
Europe. The general consequently met with
Adolf Hitlerand Benito Mussoliniand was
fully exposed to the mighty war machine of
the Third Reich. Upon returning, Yamashita
angered militants further by suggesting that
Japan had better refrain from hostilities until
the army had acquired greater mechanization
and aviation assets. He also felt that the 1940
Tripartite Pact between Japan, Italy, and Ger-
many was a strategic mistake that would drag
the country into war. Tojo ignored Yama-
shita’s recommendations and exiled him
again, this time to distant Manchuria as head
of the Kwantung Army. However, on the eve
of the Pacific War, he was recalled and given
command of the 25th Army in Southeast Asia.
If war erupted, he would become responsible
for reducing the formidable British fortress at
Singapore with deliberately inadequate num-
bers of men. This was a seemingly impossible
task and, in all likelihood,
was intended to humiliate
him.
On December 7, 1941,
Japanese naval aircraft
staged a surprise raid
upon American installa-
tions at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii, precipitating the
Pacific War. Yamashita,
who possessed only
30,000 well-trained veter-
ans, immediately com-
menced operations against
a much larger Common-
wealth garrison of 100,000.
He correctly assumed
that the European troops,
and their dispirited In-
dian and Malaysian allies,
would restrict themselves
to the major roads run-
ning up and down either coast of the penin-
sula. He therefore deployed the bulk of his
forces down the center, through deep jungle
forests. Military authorities had previously
agreed that this terrain was impassable, but
the Japanese, by clever use of bicycles, tra-
versed it with impressive speed. Moreover, as
the nominal head of the Japanese Army Air
Force, Yamashita placed a premium on con-
trol of the air, and his small but highly modern
fleet of warplanes swept the sky clean of aer-
ial opposition. The British received an even
bigger surprise when the Japanese patiently
and tenaciously managed to work their light
tanks through the jungle. Within 70 days Ya-
mashita’s forces covered 650 miles of inhos-
pitable terrain and were pressing fast upon
the Singapore bastion. Its mighty guns, re-
stricted to facing seaward, were useless dur-
ing a land invasion. At length the Japanese es-
tablished a foothold on the island, cutting its
water supply. This last measure finally in-
duced Gen. Arthur E. Percival to surrender
130,000 men on February 15, 1942. Amazingly,
the Japanese had employed only one-third as
many combatants. Singapore’s fall was thus aYAMASHITA, TOMOYUKI
Tomoyuki Yamashita
Bettmann/Corbis