drawn up a detailed plan of operations enti-
tled “Thoughts for Conducting the War from
the side of Canada” that he felt would decide
the issue with a single blow. Burgoyne con-
sulted closely with government officials under
Lord George Germainand advocated detach-
ing New England—then the hotbed of rebel-
lion—from the rest of the colonies. He pro-
posed leading 8,000 soldiers from Canada,
down the Lake Champlain Valley, to capture
Albany, New York. This would effectively
sever New England’s lines of communication
and cripple the revolution. Success, however,
required a large British force under General
Howe that would march north from New York
City to rendezvous with him at Albany. Finally,
a third column of Loyalists, regulars, and Na-
tive Americans directed by Lt. Col. Barry St.
Legerwould also march from Oswego and ad-
vance upon Fort Stanwix as a diversion. This
ancillary movement would be assisted by a
large contingent of Indians under John John-
sonand Cornplanter, which constituted the
first offensive use of Native Americans in the
war. The overall plan appeared sound on
paper, and the ebullient, supremely confident
Burgoyne posited himself as just the man to
lead it. The British government did, in fact,
formally embrace the overall strategy, but
Lord Germain failed to issue strong instruc-
tions to the various commanders involved. In
effect, they were asked to assist Burgoyne’s
main effort if possible, without actually being
subordinated to the plan. As events proved,
this lapse of command authority brought dire
consequences for Burgoyne—and the entire
war effort.
Burgoyne arrived back at Quebec in May
1777 and began assembling his army, unques-
tionably the finest British force ever dis-
patched to America. He counted among them
7,500 regular soldiers, 400 Indians, and 100
Loyalists, and he was ably seconded by a
large Hessian contingent under Baron
Friedrich von Riedesel. Consistent with the
traditions of the time, more than 2,000 camp
followers and noncombatants, including
women and children, were taken in tow. Bur-
goyne also took along an extensive baggage
train of his own, replete with fine clothing, ex-
pensive furniture, and a personal stock of
champagne. Such arrangements were com-
monplace on the battlefields of Europe, but
they appeared curiously out of place in the
North American wilderness. The British col-
umn commenced trudging south that June
and by month’s end had forced the abandon-
ment of Fort Ticonderoga. However, Ameri-
can forces under Gen. Philip Schuyler made
good their escape, despite losing their bag-
gage train at Hubbardton on July 7, 1777. The
red-coated juggernaut continued rolling for-
ward as far south as Skeensborough (White-
hall, New York) before Burgoyne made his
first strategic mistake. Rather than employ
Lake George and the various other waterways
for transportation, he opted to continue
marching overland through incredibly dense
forest and hills. It took no less than four
weeks of cutting to cover the next 22 miles, a
fatal delay that gave the Americans time to re-
group and reinforce under a new leader, Gen.
Horatio Gates. Gates initially hung back from
open combat but added to British discomfi-
ture by felling trees and sending clouds of
snipers to harass the invaders. Worse still,
General Howe felt empowered to totally dis-
regard Germain’s instructions and attacked
Philadelphia to the south. His subordinate,
General Clinton, also made a half-hearted ef-
fort to march up the Hudson Valley, captured
a few minor fortifications, then returned to
New York. Even St. Leger’s column came to
grief after defeating the American militia at
Oriskany; deserted by his Indians, he aban-
doned the siege of Fort Stanwix and with-
drew. Burgoyne’s exposed column was thus
effectively abandoned to its fate.
Having underestimated the geography ar-
rayed against him, Burgoyne’s supplies began
running low, and on August 16, 1777, he dis-
patched a large-scale foraging expedition into
Vermont under Col. Friedrich Baum.His 700
Hessians were scouring the countryside for
food when they were set upon by Gen. John
Stark and 2,000 New Hampshire militia andBURGOYNE, JOHN