Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence

CRIMEAN WAR• 123

In addition, Reade’s responsibilities at Rustum Buildings were par-

ticularly sensitive, for he was the head of the section dealing with the

recruitment, welfare, and accommodation of agents and therefore had

enjoyed access to the most secret categories of information, includ-

ing the true identities of individual agents. Reade was landed ‘‘blind’’

in Crete by Greek submarine, thePapanicholis,in November 1942,

but his mission proved quite impossible and he was withdrawn six

months later, ‘‘dismissed by the service and sent back in ignominy

to England.’’ Instead, HMSYorkwas left to the attention of the Royal

Air Force—an altogether more practical remedy.

CRIMEAN WAR.When the Crimean campaign began in September
1854, the British Army was ill prepared and devoid of any intelli-
gence organization. In each of the first three major battles, at Alma,
Balaclava, and Inkerman, the infantry and cavalry were taken by sur-
prise. Lord Raglan’s intelligence adviser wasCharles Cattley, a for-
mer British vice consul at Kerch who had been born in St. Petersburg
and spoke fluent Russian, French, and Italian. Because he was well
known in the Crimea, Cattley adopted the alias ‘‘Mr. Calvert’’ and
acted mainly as an interpreter, interrogating enemy prisoners. Never-
theless, he soon recruited some Turkish agents in the besieged city of
Sebastopol even though, as the official history noted, ‘‘The gathering
of knowledge by clandestine means were repulsive to the feelings of
an English Gentleman.’’ In 1855 Cattley was appointed head of intel-
ligence and made responsible for assessing the enemy’s strength,
morale, and ammunition reserves, but he died of cholera in July,
leaving Raglan’s successor, General Simpson, without any military
intelligence capacity.
The intelligence failures of the Crimea were exacerbated by a con-
tinuous leakage of sensitive information to newspaper correspon-
dents, who were not subject to censorship, and an efficient Russian
intelligence organization that could operate with impunity in the ab-
sence of anycounterintelligencemeasures taken by the British. In
the 12 years following the war, investigations were conducted by 17
Royal Commissions, 18 Parliamentary Select Committees, 19 War
Office committees, and 35 Special Committees, reaching conflicting
conclusions about why the army had fared so badly and been so ill
prepared.