142 • DECEPTION
lication by the originating agencies. This issue was the subject of
criticism in the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee’s
annual report, released in June 2003, after the successful occupation
of Iraq by the coalition.
Dearlove gave evidence for theHutton Inquiryover a voice link
fromVauxhall Crossand declared himself to be so pleased with the
September dossier that he had proposed a vote of thanks for the JIC’s
chairman. Under cross-examination Dearlove acknowledged that,
with the benefit of hindsight, it had been inappropriate to have placed
such emphasis on the controversial figure of 45 minutes. Dearlove’s
testimony on this point was remarkable. He confirmed that the infor-
mation had come from a single source, ‘‘equated to an Iraqi military
officer,’’ and pointed out that much of SIS’s intelligence came from
single sources, which did not necessarily devalue it. However, he also
acknowledged that the reference to 45 minutes was in relation to bat-
tlefield artillery and mortar rounds, and not missile warheads—an
admission that undermined the widely circulated assertion that the
weapons had posed a direct threat to British interests. This had been
taken to mean that Hussein could launch an attack with enhanced
Scud missiles on the British sovereign bases in Cyprus within that
short time period, but Dearlove completely undermined that proposi-
tion. Nevertheless, these unconvincing propositions served to under-
mine the integrity of the JIC and cast doubt on the extent to which
Dearlove and Scarlett had succumbed to political pressure. Dearlove
announced, in August 2003, before the end of the inquiry’s proceed-
ings, that he had been offered the mastership of Pembroke College,
Cambridge. There was immediate speculation that his Oxford-edu-
cated deputy, Nigel Inkster, would be his successor, but Scarlett was
appointed instead.DECEPTION.During World War I, deception was employed only oc-
casionally as an expedient, not as an instrument of overall strategy,
with the exception perhaps of camouflage, which was adopted uni-
versally. For example, the Royal Navy routinely disguised its war-
ships and utilized ‘‘Q ships,’’ heavily armed merchantmen disguised
as unprotected freighters, to entrap U-boats and the enemy’s surface
raiders, some of which adopted the same tactics. Q ships were cred-
ited with sinking 11 U-boats during the course of the war.