DEFECTOR• 143However, during World War II deception as a technique was given
full recognition, to the point that the chiefs of staff decreed that all
future plans should have a cover plan to mislead the enemy. Accord-
ingly, countermeasures were prepared for deflecting conventional in-
telligence-gathering methods such as aerial reconnaissance, wireless
interception, and open-source literature. In addition, deception was
institutionalized through the London Controlling Section,D Division
in India, and‘‘A’’ Forcein the Middle East, to exploit what were
termed ‘‘special means,’’ usually the manipulation of information
reaching the enemy throughdouble agents. AfterD-Day, a further
deception channel, for the management of double agents developed
on the Continent from the enemy’sstay-behind networks, was es-
tablished within theSupreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
ForceunderDick White. The policy of recruiting double agents, co-
ordinating their communications, and creating a sophisticated, inte-
grated support system was a strategy unique to the Allies, having
been introduced and refined by principally theSecret Intelligence
ServiceandMI5.
Deception not only became accepted as an essential component of
military planning but also achieved considerable success, as judged
by the study of captured enemy documents and the interrogation of
prisoners. During World War II the Axis consistently overestimated
Allied strengths, failed to discern the true objectives of imminent of-
fensives, and most famously misjudged the timing and the target of
D-Day, largely as a consequence of the ruses encapsulated inforti-
tude.See alsoGARBO.DEFECTOR.Intelligence professionals who decamp to the opposi-
tion, regardless of their motives, are known as defectors, although
some may be categorized as ideological defectors. The physical act
of moving, as opposed to a mental commitment or political conver-
sion, is the definition of a defector, soBruno Pontecorvo,Guy Bur-
gess, Donald Maclean,andKim Philby may be accurately
described as having defected, in 1950, 1951, 1951, and 1963, respec-
tively. The fact that they spied prior to their departure does not make
them ‘‘defectors-in-place,’’ a term that has no meaning within the in-
telligence community. Receipt of defectors is considered a good indi-
cation of the relative integrity of an intelligence agency, especially in