Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP• 183

was a war for which SIS was completely unprepared, and in the first

weeks of the campaign it sustained a series of body blows but was

able to recover.

Figures was invited to the prime minister’s celebration victory din-

ner at 10 Downing Street, where he was included in the group photo-

graph, and the following year received his customary knighthood,

adding to the perception that SIS had experienced ‘‘a good war.’’

Successful clandestine operations had been mounted at short notice

against the Argentines in Paris and Madrid and at the UN Mission in

New York, and the principal objectives had been achieved. Upon his

retirement in July 1985, Figures succeededSir Antony Duffasintel-

ligence coordinator to the Cabinetand passed on the Chief’s baton

to a 56-year-old Far East specialist,Christopher Curwen.

FINLAND.British Intelligence operations in Finland have been col-
ored by the assistance given to the withdrawal of British volunteers
who fought in the Winter War of 1939–40 against the Soviet Union.
TheSecret Intelligence Service(SIS) station in Helsinki, headed by
Harry Carr, was withdrawn to Stockholm, andSpecial Operations
Executivewas discouraged from operating in Finland for fear of of-
fending the Soviets. After World War II, SIS regarded Finland as a
Soviet satellite, with the SUPO security police heavily influenced by
its neighbors. The Helsinki station was headed byRex Bosleyuntil
1960, when he was transferred to Stockholm. The 1985 exfiltration
ofOleg Gordievskyover the frontier at Vyburg-Vaalimaa, to be wel-
comed in Helsinki by the SIS station commander, Meta Ramsay, is a
rare example of such a cross-border operation.

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP (FUSAG).Ostensibly
commanded by General George Patton, this entirely fictitious Ameri-
can military unit was a key component of thefortitude southde-
ceptioncampaign, intended to persuade the enemy that the Allied
invasion of France would take place in the Pas-de-Calais two weeks
after theD-Daylandings in Normandy. FUSAG was supported by
bogus wireless traffic and assemblies of dummy armor and fake land-
ing craft moored in estuaries in East Anglia. According to captured
enemy assessments of the Allied order of battle, the German High
Command accepted FUSAG’s existence, which had been reported by
double agents.