INTRODUCTION •xxiiiDuring the postwar era, and particularly in the Cold War, espionage
and counterintelligence became the chosen weapons of the Great Pow-
ers in a largely unseen struggle that was fought away from the head-
lines. Indeed, secret wars were conducted in Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, Africa, and South America, sometimes for years, before details of
the conflicts made the newspapers. And even after some sketchy disclo-
sures had been made, it would sometimes be decades before authorita-
tive information reached the public about the fierce counterinsurgency
battles that had raged in such distant lands as Borneo, Belize, and
Oman. Similarly, in the war against terrorism, it may be a long time
before the full details are learned of how the Provisional IRA was pene-
trated or the Irish National Liberation Army was coaxed into self-de-
struction. But although the results of clandestine operations may
manifest themselves only in cease-fires, amnesties, and commitments
to peace, the cognoscenti know all too well that such events are most
likely achieved after a heavy investment in covert activities.
Of course, not everything is quite what it seems in the conflict be-
tween spies and counterspies, and any assessment of British Intelli-
gence has to take account of the disasters, failures, security lapses, and
examples of hostile penetration. Some of the most celebrated names as-
sociated with British Intelligence are notorious traitors, such as the infa-
mous ‘‘Cambridge Five,’’ Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Kim Philby,
Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. Together they hemorrhaged clas-
sified documents from most of Britain’s secret departments before,
during, and after World War II. They compromised British person-
nel, identified agents operating overseas, and wrecked innumerable
schemes, including those to infiltrate partisans into postwar Albania and
the Baltic states. These Cold War stratagems were effectively neutral-
ized by the intervention of Philby and his network, which exercised an
influence at the very highest level of British Intelligence. But while the
KGB’s recruits, such as George Blake, Leo Long, and Michael Betta-
ney, sought to wreak havoc from their trusted positions within British
Intelligence, what about the less well-known figures, such as the two
Special Branch detectives who sold out to Moscow, or the Communist
secretary who obtained a job in the heart of MI5’s innermost sanctum,
the Security Service Registry? Few such names appear in the many
books written about British Intelligence, but they are, nonetheless, vital
participants in what Rudyard Kipling called ‘‘the great game.’’