10 • ALBANIA
with the remainder of the contingent. In July 1943, twoRoyal Air
Force(RAF) officers, Tony Neel and Andy Hands, were dropped,
and in August four teams were launched on the same day in two Hali-
faxes from Derna:sculptor, led by Major Bill Tilman;sconce,by
Major George Seymour;sapling, by Major Gerry Field; andstep-
mother,byPeter Kemp. Together these missions, attached to large
mixed bands of Communist irregulars, Italian deserters, and Bulgar-
ian stragglers harried the occupying forces by setting ambushes and
organizing raids on local enemy garrisons. Although none of the ac-
tions by itself led to any general collapse of the occupation, the Ger-
mans were obliged to waste precious resources at a critical time by
strengthening an area that had virtually no strategic value.
McLean and Smiley were extracted in November 1943 by motor
torpedo boat from the coast to Bari, and by that time SOE’s presence
in Albania was considerable. Richard Riddell and Anthony Simcox
were flown in to replace McLean and Smiley, and John Hibberdine
was dropped in December with Lieutenants Merritt and Hibbert. By
the end of April 1944, Smiley was back, onconsensus ii, this time
accompanied by Julian Amery. These operations were not achieved
without casualties. Two Halifaxes crashed in Albania while ap-
proaching their drop zones, killing their crews and two entire SOE
missions. Major Field blew himself up with high explosives while
fishing, and Colonel Arthur Nicholls died of gangrene.sconce’s
wireless operator, Bombardier Hill, was killed by enemy action and
Trooper Roberts ofstepmotherdied of exposure after he had been
captured and then managed to escape. Brigadier Davies was also cap-
tured, in January 1944, along with Jim Chesshire, Captain F. Tray-
horn, and his RAF sergeant, a former rear gunner named Smith.
Another significant loss was Philip Leake, killed in a German air raid
six weeks after he landed in May 1944.
SOE personnel sent to Albania endured appalling privations, but
perpetuated the strategic fiction that the Balkans was the likely target
for an Allied thrust straight into Germany. This scenario, ever popu-
lar withWinston Churchill, was never a likely prospect, but the
German High Command failed to appreciate the strength of opposi-
tion articulated by the chiefs of staff and the Americans. In conse-
quence, a disproportionate number of Axis units was kept tied up in
southeast Europe by what amounted to a tiny group of Allied liaison