596 • YUGOSLAVIA
Several of those who fought with the Cetniks and Partisans have
written accounts of their experiences, with varying degrees of bitter-
ness. Certainly many of the SOE personnel who managed to return
to Bari held strong views on what was perceived to be mismanage-
ment inCairo, if not ruthless political manipulation. Occasionally
the high feelings reached Castellani, whereForce 266was accom-
modated, and sometimes those who had backed the Cetniks, and
thought they had been betrayed, had to be separated from the rest. A
few of the survivors have recounted their adventures. Jasper Roo-
tham, who liaised with Mihailovic’s forces wroteMiss Firein 1946,
whileWilliam Deakin(The Embattled Mountain), Donald Hamil-
ton-Hill (SOE Assignment), Lindsay Rogers (Guerilla Surgeon), Mi-
chael Lees (The Rape of Serbia), andBasil Davidson(Partisan
Picture) have described their experiences fighting with the Partisans.
Together they provide an epic picture of disjointed supplies, atro-
cious weather, inadequate shelter, and poor food, but an indomitable
spirit among the native population that, regrettably, rarely set aside
the complexities of local politics to combine against the common
enemy. Against a backdrop of spasmodic communications, insuffi-
cient air support, and a headquarters staff that could never be com-
pletely up to date with the latest developments in the field, the liaison
personnel often felt isolated if not ignored. All those who experi-
enced the Yugoslav scene at first hand found it both harrowing and
rewarding. Another common strand, highlighted by Deakin and
based on his own acute observation while leadingtypical, SOE’s
pathfinding mission to Tito in May 1943, was the ‘‘lack of vital and
accurate intelligence of events within Yugoslavia at crucial mo-
ments.’’ The fact thattypical’s mission was officially concluded in
September 1943, but its survivors were unable to reach Italy until
early December is itself evidence of some of the other difficulties
encountered by SOE’s men in the field that they regarded as avoid-
able.YUGOSLAVIA.Section Dof theSecret Intelligence Serviceused the
British embassy in Belgrade as a regional base until it was evacuated
in April 1941 when the Axis occupied the country. Contact was es-
tablished with the resistance forces led by GeneralDraza Mihai-
lovic, but the British government concluded—based on the faulty