602 • ZINOVIEV LETTER
Im Thurn’s diary reveals that he was in touch with the new DNI,
Admiral Sir Alan Hotham, who had put him in touch with Maw, and
that he was already talking to MI5’s Colonel Alexander and to Bunty
Saunders of Scotland Yard, in what now appears to be a race to see
who would publish the Zinoviev Letter first. As for the intermediaries
at Central Office, there was any number of possibilities, including
Joseph Ball, the MI5 officer who in 1929 was to be appointed direc-
tor of Central Office’s Research Department, and the party’s chair-
man, Lord Davidson, who later may have paid im Thurn £5,000.
When the document was first circulated the Foreign Office’s
Northern Department contacted Captain Hugh Miller, Scotland
Yard’s expert on Communism, and he confirmed that the content was
similar in tone to what he read in the Comintern’s regular journal,
International Press Correspondence. The final proof, as presented by
SIS, was Morton’s assertion that he had met his spy inside the
CPGB, Jim Finney, on the evening of 10 October, who had corrobo-
rated receipt in London of Zinoviev’s directive, and he had written a
memorandum recording the fact on 11 October. However, close scru-
tiny of Morton’s minute revealed that Finney had not made any direct
reference to a specific letter from Zinoviev, and MI5 and Scotland
Yard’sSpecial Branch, both surprised and dismayed to learn that
Morton had been running an agent inside the CPGB without sharing
that knowledge with them, expressed reservations about the strength
of this meeting as corroboration. It also seemed that Finney, who had
used the alias Finlay, had previously worked briefly for MI5, but had
not proved reliable.
The problem that emerged forSir Hugh Sinclairas various inves-
tigations were conducted into the origins and authenticity of the Zi-
noviev Letter was that SIS found it hard to refute Labour accusations
of SIS collusion with the Conservative party and interference and
manipulation during the general election campaign. As Bennett even-
tually concluded, the letter itself was undoubtedly a forgery, although
its composition was sufficiently skillful to persuade those who read
it of its intrinsic authenticity. No blame could be attached to Meikle-
john for acquiring this tantalizing item and sending it to headquar-
ters, and Morton acted quite properly by circulating it to SIS’s
clients.
As for who actually peddled the original Russian document in