Germans in 1942, to form an anticommunist liberation army, and re-
cruitment among frontline Soviet units proved successful, Hitler dis-
missed the notion of Germany underwriting a Russian military unit
as “extraordinary nonsense.” At that point, Gehlen concluded that
Hitler was incapable of rational argument and would lead Germany
to ruin. Nevertheless, despite allowing several anti-Nazis in the FHO
to engage in conspiratorial discussions, he kept his distance from
the military resistance to Hitler and expressed surprise following the
failed plot of 20 July 1944. Moreover, the abolition of the Abwehr
earlier that spring had forced him to form close ties with the Sicher-
heitsdienst (SD; Security Service) under Walter Schellenberg, and
by the end of the year, he had been promoted to brigadier general and
was charged with the evacuation of the General Staff in the event of
an emergency. As the German position continued to degenerate in the
face of the Red Army, Gehlen’s realistic reports, strongly endorsed
by the new army chief of staff, Heinz Guderian, only aroused Hitler’s
ire, and both men were dismissed in April 1945. Fearful of assassina-
tion by SS chief Heinrich Himmler, Gehlen, along with members of
his staff, remained in hiding until their capture by American soldiers
in a small Bavarian village the following month.
Convinced of the artificiality of the Allied alliance and that Ger-
many would be needed by the United States and Great Britain in
their eventual struggle against the Soviet Union, Gehlen had already
taken steps to ensure a postwar role for himself. Because he knew
in advance that the Americans would be occupying Bavaria, copies
of the comprehensive FHO archives had been placed in 50 sealed
drums and buried in the vicinity of Bad Reichenhall. Gehlen’s plan
soon came to fruition, primarily because his American interroga-
tor in Wiesbaden, John Boker, shared his convictions regarding the
Soviet Union and realized how little intelligence the U.S. Army had
in its possession. Most of the archives were unearthed, and Boker as-
sembled several former FHO members, including Gerhard Wessel
and Heinz Danko Herre.
Although this group worked tirelessly and produced some insight-
ful reports on the Soviet Union, the problem for Gehlen was twofold:
convincing the Americans of his future usefulness, and preventing
his cooperation from being viewed as treason in German eyes. Still
technically a prisoner and liable for war crimes prosecution, he was
GEHLEN, REINHARD • 129