terms, the dense surveillance that it achieved was unparalleled in his-
tory, even among other Eastern bloc states. According to one historian’s
calculations, the number of full-time MfS employees in 1989 relative
to the population of the GDR was 1:180, whereas in the Soviet Union,
the figure came to 1:595; other members of the Warsaw Pact such as
Hungary and Czechoslovakia trailed further behind.^5
Moreover, the MfS—despite the existence of a separate directorate for
foreign intelligence within its ranks (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung)—
often combined operations at home and abroad in such a way that they
became practically indistinguishable. A military counterintelligence or-
ganization (Verwaltung Aufklärung) also came into existence, but even
though it was formally connected to the Nationale Volksarmee (National
People’s Army), the MfS acted as an overseer, often inserting its own
officers in disguise. In addition, it had task forces in readiness, trained in
terror and sabotage, in the event of war or heightened domestic tension.^6
Yet, as unrest grew in the GDR during the fall of 1989, the MfS proved
unable to control the opposition groups, and a major fissure opened vis-à-
vis the leadership of the SED as well. At the conclusion of the nonviolent
revolution that resulted in the dissolution of the MfS and the reunification
of the two Germanys, the country broke new historical ground by the
passage of the Stasi Records Act of 1991. Although Western intelligence
organizations would doubtlessly have preferred to see these potentially
incriminating documents destroyed, the unwavering determination of East
German dissidents prevailed, and citizens were given the opportunity to
examine their personal Stasi files under careful supervision.
Writing in 1923, Walter Nicolai defined the role of intelligence as
“warfare in peacetime,“ for he sensed that competition among the major
powers would become increasingly more sophisticated and ruthless.^7
However prescient the observations of the former spymaster at the time,
his concept of intelligence would hardly find overwhelming acceptance
in today’s Germany. Indeed, controversy continues to surround the
FRG’s two major intelligence organizations. In the case of the BND,
critics are prone to level the charge of incompetence, stressing how
ill-conceived operations abroad often boomeranged, thereby leaving
hapless agents to fend for themselves. Even though numerous reforms
have taken place—the current organization bears scant resemblance to
Gehlen’s original creation—the BND has been less than successful in
presenting a persuasive case for itself. Unlike the situation in the United
INTRODUCTION • xxxiii