a far more vigilant posture was taken in the eastern border regions
stretching from Silesia to East Prussia. By 1893, following reports
of a heavy infiltration of Russian agents, a number of intelligence
posts had been constructed along the frontier, all staffed with experi-
enced officers. Nevertheless, counterintelligence remained a largely
neglected branch, and Russian spies had little difficulty in exploiting
this porous situation. Meager funding posed an additional problem,
thus limiting the army’s coverage to Russia and France. “N” (naval
intelligence) handled matters involving Great Britain beginning in
1901, while the United States and Italy received no attention at all.
With the outbreak of World War I came Section IIIb’s upgrading
to the status of an Abteilung under Walter Nicolai as well as the
establishment of a press and propaganda office under its direction.
Its personnel likewise grew from 77 officers in 1915 to 188 three
years later. At the same time—in a relationship characterized by
much mutual suspicion—actual intelligence assessment was handled
by the Fremde Heere. Whereas the static frontline conditions in the
West limited the role of intelligence-gathering, greater opportuni-
ties arose regarding Russia, as shown by the activities of Alexander
Bauermeister. Yet as the war situation deteriorated, Nicolai not only
increased the propaganda effort but began to demand information
about persons suspected of undermining morale within Germany—a
move bitterly criticized by his left-wing opponents. Following the ar-
mistice, the chief of the General Staff, Paul von Hindenburg, ordered
the dissolution of Abteilung IIIb effective 20 November 1918 and
replaced it with a new but short-lived department. See also NACH-
RICHTENOFFIZIER BERLIN.ABWEHR. Ultimately an intelligence branch of the Wehrmacht
(Armed Forces), the Abwehr traces its origins to January 1921, when,
according to the Treaty of Versailles, the German military was re-
stricted to defensive operations. Although Abwehr, or “fending off,”
connotes counterintelligence, the group was engaged in information
collection from the outset, relying principally on human intelligence
sources. It was first headed by Friedrich Gempp, a former deputy to
Walter Nicolai, the head of Abteilung IIIb during World War I,
and consisted of a meager group of three officers and seven former
officers along with a clerical staff. Three main sections emerged
2 • ABWEHR