1952, when Heusinger was named head of the military division of the
Blank Office (the forerunner of the West German Defense Ministry),
Wessel became part of the intelligence staff. With the creation of the
Bundeswehr in 1956, he occupied a number of important positions,
beginning with its counterintelligence branch, which later became
known as the Militärischer Abschirmdienst.
When the Spiegel Affair and the unmasking of Heinz Felfe
darkened the image of the BND in the early 1960s, Wessel’s name
circulated as possible successor to Gehlen. Yet it was not until 1967
that Gehlen, under pressure from the new government of Kurt Georg
Kiesinger, finally agreed to leave his post. Wessel, Gehlen’s own
preference, easily persuaded the chancellor of his qualifications and
became the new BND president on 1 May 1968. From the outset,
however, his concept of a modern intelligence service differed mark-
edly from that of his predecessor, despite their close past association.
Having recently served as the German military representative to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he wanted the BND to shed its
excessive secrecy and become more integrated with other state insti-
tutions. When a three-member commission under Reinhold Mercker
investigated internal complaints of BND mismanagement at the
highest level, its 200-page report remained highly confidential—not
even available to Wessel—but its main recommendations called for
the cessation of domestic surveillance, greater oversight, and closer
proximity to the Chancellor’s Office in Bonn.
Wessel’s arrival in Pullach met with stiff resistance. Some officers
thought Horst Wendland, head of the organization and acting vice
president, was Gehlen’s natural successor, and they resented Wes-
sel’s role in building up the military’s counterintelligence service at
the BND’s expense. But Wessel, believing that Wendland was part
of the pattern of abuse at the BND, blocked his further advancement.
Realizing that his future prospects were bleak, Wendland resigned
and shortly afterward committed suicide. A few hours later in the
Eifel region, his friend, retired Admiral Hermann Lüdke, likewise
took his life (presumably he had been recruited under a falsche
Flagge by the Czechoslovakian service). As a number of other sui-
cides by military and government figures followed in rapid succes-
sion, the general public grew alarmed that a major conspiracy was
afoot, thereby increasing the urgency of Wessel’s reform program.490 • WESSEL, GERHARD