ident Anwar Sadat had changed his mind in the fall of 1972. By late
1972, however, Sadat had decided that, instead of waiting for the So-
viets to provide long-range bombers and Scud missiles, he would
stage a limited attack into the western Sinai in order to shatter the
status quo and spur the international community to set a political
process in motion that would end with Israel’s return to the interna-
tional border. President Sadat decided that he would go to war with-
out Scud missiles and without Sukhoi bombers and would rely on his
heavy surface-to-air missiles. Marwan Ashraf failed to notify Israel of
this change in policy, either because he was unaware of it or, as the
double-agent school might contend, because he was part of the Egypt-
ian deception.
In Israel, the Concept remained unchanged—it was even rein-
forced. Even when it did eventually become clear that the Arabs had
aggressive intentions, Israeli intelligence analysts refused to believe
that they would actually follow through on them. The Egyptian mili-
tary buildup continued to be explained away as practice exercises
without harmful intentions. Syrian deployments were more worrying.
Even after the air battle of 13 September 1973, Syrian reinforcements
were sent to the Golan. Leaves were canceled and Syrian reserves
were called up, with a declaration of a state of alert. All these devel-
opments were worrying, especially to the IDF Northern Command.
But because the Concept still held that Syria would not attack with-
out Egypt, and Egypt was not planning to go to war, Syrian intentions
were deemed not really aggressive in nature. This view survived even
after King Hussein’s Warningto Prime Minister Golda Meir on 25
September 1973 and the CIA’s warning on the night of 29/30 Sep-
tember 1973 that a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack was possible.
The MI analysts still concluded that it was nothing to worry about.
The Concept collapsed when reality totally changed, with the out-
break of the war on 6 October 1973.
Despite the lessons of the Yom Kippur War, concepts still domi-
nate states’ thinking and analysis. For example, on the eve of the
2003 U.S. war against Iraq, the U.S. concept was that Saddam Hus-
sein had various kinds of weapons of mass destruction and intended
to use them if his back were against the wall. This concept has proved
mistaken. See also AGRANAT COMMISSION; KNIZER, ZUSIA;
LOW PROBABILITY.CONCEPT, THE•7106-102 (02) A-G.qxd 3/24/06 7:23 AM Page 71