rael’s 1982 Peace for Galilee Operation, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.
The ill-starred outcome of this operation began the destruction of
Kimche’s reputation as a cautious intelligence officer. Kimche tried
to use his connections in the Israeli press, albeit with little success, to
distance himself from some of the more precarious policies of De-
fense Minister Ariel Sharon in Lebanon.
Missing his clandestine activity, in 1982 Kimche masterminded an
elaborate arms sales deal with Iran, later known as the Irangate Af-
fair. The affair revealed Kimche’s enormous power in the Israeli for-
eign policy establishment. After the Irangate scandal, Kimche re-
signed from his Foreign Ministry post to enter “private business.” He
worked with the mysterious Shaul Eisenberg, whose arms dealings
made him the richest man in Israel. Kimche through his “private busi-
ness” had a key role in expanding Israeli arms exports to China.KING HUSSEIN’S WARNING.On 25 September 1973, just 12 days
before the start of the Yom Kippur War, King Hussein, ruler of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, met Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir
in the guest room of a Mossadfacility at Pi Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.
The king, who had initiated this urgent meeting, risking his own life and
the future of his monarchy, warned the prime minister that the Israeli-
Arab diplomatic impasse would lead to a war, which Egypt and Syria
were intent on launching. Others present at the meeting included
Mordechai Gazit, director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, and
Lou Keidar, Meir’s assistant and confidant. The discussion was trans-
mitted by closed circuit television to a screen in the next room and
watched by the prime minister’s military secretary, Brigadier General
Yisrael Lior, and Lieutenant Colonel Zusia Knizer, head of the Jordan
desk of the Research Department of Military Intelligence(MI).
The prime minister also shared the information she received from
Hussein with her defense minister, Moshe Dayan, whom she con-
sulted on whether to cancel her forthcoming visit to the Socialist In-
ternational convention at Strasbourg. Dayan replied that Hussein’s
warning conveyed nothing new and there was no reason for her to
change her plans. Keidar’s conclusion, on the other hand, was that the
prime minister must prepare for war. Meir herself reportedly simply
did not believe King Hussein. The director of MI, Eliyahu (Eli)
Zeira, in his subsequent book on the role of intelligence on the eveKING HUSSEIN’S WARNING • 14906-102 (03) H-P.qxd 3/24/06 7:24 AM Page 149