Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence

patched to Yemen to organize the operation. It was kept secret and re-

vealed to the media only several months after its completion.

MAGNA CARTA 2.To halt the internal clashes within the Israeli in-

telligence community, in early 2000 the Mossadinitiated an agree-

ment known to its shadowy denizens as “Magna Carta 2.” This was

an agreement on the division of labor among the Mossad, Military

Intelligence(MI), and the Israeli Security Agency(ISA) aimed at

introducing order into their work. It was concluded by the directors

of these three organizations: Efraim Halevy, Amos Malka, and Ami

Ayalon, respectively. The document determined who was responsible

for what, specifying in detail the responsibilities of each organization

down the various ranks.

Magna Carta 2 acknowledges that MI is the senior intelligence or-

ganization for collections and assessments. In terms of geographical

range, MI is responsible for collecting information from the neigh-

boring countries, the so-called target countries. MI fulfills its respon-

sibilities by technical means of collection or by operating agents

across the frontiers of target countries. For example, Unit 504oper-

ates agents abroad, but only in areas close to the borders of hostile

states. The Mossad operates agents in countries farther afield, includ-

ing Arab states. If necessary, its agents might penetrate Arab countries

through third countries, known as “base countries.” The ISA handles

domestic intelligence, although MI conducts political and military as-

sessment in the Palestinian Authority (PA); by one interpretation, the

PA is deemed a neighboring country, not an autonomy within Israel.

By contrast, the ISA, as a preventive rather than an intelligence or-

ganization, is wholly responsible for forestalling any terrorismfrom

the PA area. MI is therefore only an auxiliary element in the sphere,

providing the ISA with the necessary intelligence.

According to the Magna Carta 2, the ISA’s main tasks are preemp-

tion of Palestinian terrorism; counterintelligence; prevention of any un-

derground activity, whether political or terrorist, by all Israeli sectors,

including Arabs and Jews; and the security of important personalities

and institutions. Since the 1967 Six-Day War, MI has not provided the

ISA with any intelligence support within the Green Line (i.e., the pre-

1967 border), because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are forbidden to

operate in the Israeli civilian sector. In the former Lebanon security

MAGNA CARTA 2• 173

06-102 (03) H-P.qxd 3/24/06 7:25 AM Page 173