years. As economic and political conditions in Ethiopia deteriorated,
tens of thousands of Jews set out to cross the border into neighboring
Sudan. In 1979 Israel, and to a smaller degree private organizations,
began to evacuate the Ethiopian Jews from Sudan by various covert
means and bring them to Israel. As word reached the Jewish villages in
Ethiopia that the route to Israel was through Sudan, the flow of Jewish
refugees across the border increased dramatically. The Mossad,
through its Tsafririm unit, was tasked with handling the rescue of the
Ethiopian Jews. Initially it arranged periodic flights from a secret
airstrip in the desert near the refugee camps. But during the winter of
1984 it became clear that the refugee camps in Sudan were filling up
very quickly and that the mode of rescue had to be completely
changed; otherwise, the risk of the refugees dying in large numbers in
the squalid camps or being caught by the Sudanese—as a result ex-
posing the entire operation—was too high. The Mossad sought an al-
ternative fast evacuation.
Israeli officials decided to approach the United States for its assis-
tance. This request created a major dilemma for the United States be-
cause, unlike Israel, which was technically at war with Sudan, the
United States enjoyed very close relations with President Gaafar al-
Numeiri. Sudan’s geostrategic position along the Red Sea, the stability
of the Horn of Africa, and freedom of navigation through the Bab el-
Mandeb straits could not be ignored by the United States. For this rea-
son the United States provided Sudan with large amounts of aid, and
consequently exercised a great deal of leverage over Numeiri. In 1984
Numeiri was in urgent need of further U.S. aid because of Sudan’s fail-
ing economy, civil unrest, and the need to take care of the nearly half
a million refugees living there. The majority of the refugees were non-
Jews. The problem was that as a member of the Arab League, Numeiri
could not afford to be seen helping the Zionists. U.S. officials were
well aware of Sudan’s instability and were hesitant to do anything that
might further endanger Numeiri’s regime.
A Sudanese representative traveled to the United States in June
1984 to ask for additional economic aid. In a meeting with Richard
Krieger and Eugene Banks of the State Department, Krieger decided
to play on his visitor’s anti-Semitic feelings; he suggested that the ap-
proval of the omnipotent Jewish lobby would be necessary to obtain
congressional support for an increase in aid. He suggested that Sudan188 • MOSES OPERATION/MIVTSA MOSHE06-102 (03) H-P.qxd 3/24/06 7:25 AM Page 188