Sinai Peninsula. Nasser places the Egyptian army on full alert. The Is-
raeli intelligence community, having calculated that the Arab armies
will not be ready for war until 1969 or 1970, is taken by surprise. 19
May:Egypt deploys six army divisions to the Sinai. Mossad director
Amit suggests that Israel publish aerial reconnaissance photographs of
the massive Egyptian deployment; this tactic, according to Amit, would
justify Israel’s mobilization of its army reserves, begun in the early
hours of 16 May. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol rejects the idea. 20 May:
Military Intelligence (MI) receives ominous information that Nasser
has recalled three Egyptian brigades from Yemen. The same day, Egypt-
ian forces enter Sharm al-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Penin-
sula. 22–23 May: At midnight Nasser announces the closure of the
Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, thus sealing Israel’s
only shipping route through the Red Sea. Israel considers this move a
casus belli; such a step has been Israel’s red line since the Sinai Cam-
paign of 1956, and since then Israel has declared several times that it
will not tolerate any such blockade. 23 May: The Israeli cabinet holds
a briefing, with the participation of MI director Yariv, and concludes
that with the closure of the Strait of Tiran it is now merely a question of
time until a military response is made. 30 May:In a genuinely surpris-
ing move, Jordan’s King Hussein flies to Cairo. MI is fully aware of the
deep ongoing animosity between Nasser and Hussein. During this visit,
the two leaders conclude a mutual defense pact and announce that Jor-
dan will form a joint military command with Egypt under an Egyptian
general on the Jordanian front. 2 June:The Israeli cabinet decides in
principle to launch a preemptive war. The military recognizes the dan-
ger in delaying any longer: more Egyptian troops will arrive from
Yemen, and the USSR will continue supplying weapons to Egypt.
Moreover, it is understood that the United Nations and United States
will do nothing to break Nasser’s blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. MI is
aware of the inadequacy of Egyptian preparations and its army’s weak
morale. 4 June:The Israeli cabinet resolves to start the war the follow-
ing morning. 5 June:The IAF strikes Arab military airfields and de-
stroys 304 of the 419 Egyptian aircraft on the ground, 53 of 112 Syrian
planes, and Jordan’s entire 28-plane air force. 6 June:A radiotelephone
conversation between Nasser and King Hussein over the public tele-
phone system is tapped by two veteran MI officers using vintage World
War II equipment. By that time most of Nasser’s air force has beenxxviii • CHRONOLOGY06-102 (01) FM.qxd 3/24/06 7:22 AM Page xxviii