Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence

Black September Organization. Adwan was killed on 9 April 1973

during the Spring of Youth Operationin revenge for his part in the

Munich massacreof Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games.

See also WRATH OF GOD OPERATION.

AGAF MODI’IN (AMAN).SeeMILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

AGRANAT COMMISSION.The full name of this commission is the

Agranat Commission of Inquiry into the Events of the Yom Kippur

War. Responding to public pressure in the wake of the surprise Yom

Kippur War of October 1973, on 18 November 1973 the Israeli gov-

ernment resolved to establish a state commission of inquiry to in-

vestigate the reasons for Israel’s mehdal(“flaw”) regarding the war.

The commission, headed by Supreme Court president Shimon

Agranat, consisted of Supreme Court justice Moshe Landau, State

Comptroller Yitzhak Nebenzahl, and two former chiefs of the gen-

eral staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Yigael Yadin and

Chaim Laskov. The mandate of the Agranat Commission was to in-

vestigate two issues: what information was available during the pe-

riod preceding the war on the enemy’s moves and intentions, and the

evaluations by the military leaders concerned; and the preparedness

of the IDF before the war and its functioning during the first three

days of the fighting.

The commission’s interim report was published on 2 April 1974.

It was only 40 pages long and recommended the removal from ac-

tive duty in intelligence work of the director of Military Intelli-

gence (MI), Major General Eliyahu (Eli) Zeira; his deputy,

Brigadier General Aryeh Shalev; Lieutenant Colonel David

Gedaliah, the intelligence officer of the Southern Command; and

Lieutenant Colonel Yonah Bendman, head of the Egyptian desk in

MI. The commission also recommended that the head of the South-

ern Command, Major General Shmuel Gonen, and the chief of the

General Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar, be removed from

their posts because the latter had not made his own intelligence

evaluations, failed to prepare a detailed defense plan, and had been

overconfident in the ability of the Israeli army to repel the enemy

with regular forces only. The commission found that the IDF had

received appropriate information regarding Egyptian and Syrian

preparations but it was not interpreted correctly because of the

AGRANAT COMMISSION•5

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