Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence

(coco) #1
Black September Organization. Adwan was killed on 9 April 1973
during the Spring of Youth Operationin revenge for his part in the
Munich massacreof Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games.
See also WRATH OF GOD OPERATION.

AGAF MODI’IN (AMAN).SeeMILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

AGRANAT COMMISSION.The full name of this commission is the
Agranat Commission of Inquiry into the Events of the Yom Kippur
War. Responding to public pressure in the wake of the surprise Yom
Kippur War of October 1973, on 18 November 1973 the Israeli gov-
ernment resolved to establish a state commission of inquiry to in-
vestigate the reasons for Israel’s mehdal(“flaw”) regarding the war.
The commission, headed by Supreme Court president Shimon
Agranat, consisted of Supreme Court justice Moshe Landau, State
Comptroller Yitzhak Nebenzahl, and two former chiefs of the gen-
eral staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Yigael Yadin and
Chaim Laskov. The mandate of the Agranat Commission was to in-
vestigate two issues: what information was available during the pe-
riod preceding the war on the enemy’s moves and intentions, and the
evaluations by the military leaders concerned; and the preparedness
of the IDF before the war and its functioning during the first three
days of the fighting.
The commission’s interim report was published on 2 April 1974.
It was only 40 pages long and recommended the removal from ac-
tive duty in intelligence work of the director of Military Intelli-
gence (MI), Major General Eliyahu (Eli) Zeira; his deputy,
Brigadier General Aryeh Shalev; Lieutenant Colonel David
Gedaliah, the intelligence officer of the Southern Command; and
Lieutenant Colonel Yonah Bendman, head of the Egyptian desk in
MI. The commission also recommended that the head of the South-
ern Command, Major General Shmuel Gonen, and the chief of the
General Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar, be removed from
their posts because the latter had not made his own intelligence
evaluations, failed to prepare a detailed defense plan, and had been
overconfident in the ability of the Israeli army to repel the enemy
with regular forces only. The commission found that the IDF had
received appropriate information regarding Egyptian and Syrian
preparations but it was not interpreted correctly because of the

AGRANAT COMMISSION•5

06-102 (02) A-G.qxd 3/24/06 7:23 AM Page 5

Free download pdf