Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

early 1950s he defected to the Central Intelligence Agency, which

safely exfiltrated him out of Austria. Deryabin later wrote a number

of books on KGB operations.

DÉTENTE.Détente lasted from 1972 to 1981 and is seen as a success

for both American and Soviet diplomacy. U.S. President Richard

Nixon saw détente as a means of reducing the tensions of the Cold

Warand expanding commercial ties with the Soviet bloc. The Soviet

understanding of the process of détente was different. Soviet party

leader Leonid Brezhnevtold the Politburo: “We communists have to

string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their credits,

their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going to continue

massive military programs, and by the mid-1980s we will be in a po-

sition to return to a more aggressive foreign policy.” Brezhnev’s tac-

tics may have been influenced by analysisfrom the Central Com-

mittee that capitalism was weakened and that the Soviet Union was

in the driver’s seat.

The KGB saw détente as a golden age in which to collect techni-

cal and industrial intelligence. Throughout the 1970s, the KGB

strengthened Directorate T of the First Chief Directorate and its Line

X (Scientific Intelligence) officers in rezidenturasabroad. More than

200 Line X officers were operating in Western states in the mid-

1970s. The GRUalso increased its scientific and technical collection.

Détente often gave Soviet intelligence officers access to sensitive

plants, and they took advantage of almost every collection opportu-

nity. For instance, a KGB officer visiting the Boeing plant in Seattle

put adhesive tape on his shoes to collect metal samples.

Détente also provided the Communist Partyand the KGB with a

challenge. A policy of even partial openness seemed to encourage

dissent, which the Brezhnev leadership was determined to stifle. In

the 1970s the KGB cracked down very hard on religious and politi-

cal dissidentsto show that détente did not mean liberalization. Nev-

ertheless, in the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, détente did spur na-

tionalist and religious dissent. In Moscow, Soviet human rights

organizations and critics like Andrei Sakharovemerged, only to be

quickly crushed by the KGB.

Détente is often seen as a setback for the naïve Western democra-

cies in the intelligence Cold War. It is true that the Soviet economy

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