Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

spite his eccentricities, Goleniewski was one of the most important of

the CIA’s counterintelligence agents of the Cold War. He provided

the West with important details of KGB operations and the Soviet

service’s ability to recruit and run agents in the West. His informa-

tion, which compromised Blake badly, damaged KGB operations.

GOLIKOV, FILIPP IVANOVICH (1900–1980).Golikov followed

Ivan Proskurovas military intelligence chief. Five of his predeces-

sor had been executed for treason in the previous three years. As chief

of the GRUin 1940 and 1941, Golikov bares considerable responsi-

bility for the Soviet response to Operation Barbarossa. Despite

warnings from agents with access to Nazi war plans, Golikov repeat-

edly watered down his service’s reporting on Nazi military prepara-

tion to Joseph Stalin. Aware that Stalin did not believe Adolf Hitler

would invade the Soviet Union in 1941, Golikov often labeled accu-

rate intelligence submitted to Stalin as unreliable, dubious, or British

disinformation. Miraculously, Golikov was not punished for his gross

malfeasance but was assigned to a troop command within days of the

German invasion. During the war, Golikov commanded armies and

fronts. In 1961 he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union. See

alsoFITIN, PAVEL.

GOLITSYN, ANATOLI MIKHAILOVICH (1926– ). The most diffi-

cult and disruptive defectorin the history of the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), Golitsyn defected to the CIA station in Helsinki, Fin-

land, on 15 December 1961. AKGBmajor at the time of his defection,

Golitsyn was slated for demotion for lack of performance. While he

had a poor record as an operation officer, he had knowledge of KGB

operations in Europe from previous tours in Vienna and Moscow.

Golitsyn and his family were flown immediately to the United

States for debriefing. Over the next several months, he provided the

CIA with information about KGB operations in Western Europe as

well as the names of several Soviet agents. He also reportedly told

CIA director Allan Dulles that the KGB had not penetrated the CIA.

Later, however, Golitsyn changed his story, claiming that the KGB

had indeed recruited several sources inside the CIA. Golitsyn’s

charges were accepted by CIAcounterintelligencechief James Jesus

Angleton and set off a “mole hunt,” which destroyed the careers of

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