fused to return: “Don’t you see that I must go back? Shall I hide now?
If I do, they will tell you the priest was a spy.” Mally was arrested on
his return and tortured. He was tried on 20 September 1938, con-
victed of working for several hostile intelligence services, and shot
the same evening. Following Joseph Stalin’s death, he was posthu-
mously rehabilitated and his picture hangs in the service’s museum.MARKOV, GEORGI (1929–1978).A Bulgarian dissidentresiding in
London, Markov was slated for executionby the Bulgarian security
service because his broadcasts on the BBC World Service were cre-
ating problems for the communist regime. KGBChair Yuri An-
dropovagreed to provide both the poison and a specialist in assist-
ing the Bulgarian allies in murdering Markov. On 7 September 1978,
while Markov waited for a bus on Waterloo Bridge, he received a
lethal dose of ricin fired from an air gun concealed in an umbrella.
His assassin was a Bulgarian intelligence officer. He died four days
later in a London hospital. Oleg Kalugin, a KGB counterintelli-
gencespecialist, wrote in his memoirs that Andropov had authorized
the assassination out of “solidarity” with the Bulgarian intelligence
service. Kalugin, who acted as the KGB’s representative during the
planning stage of the assassination, was later denied entry into Great
Britain because of his part in the murder.MASKIROVKA.The Soviet military and intelligence term for strategic
deception is maskirovka. Soviet military and intelligence doctrines
called for a mixture of denial and deception measures to deceive for-
eign enemies: this doctrine impacted on Soviet counterintelligence
operations as well as their military deception and denial activities.
Beginning in the early 1920s, the Chekacreated false White Russian
movements, and operations such as the Trust, to deceive foreign in-
telligence services and lure émigré leaders back to the Soviet Union.
During World War II, the Soviet sources used complicated radio
gamesto confuse Berlin as to Red Army intentions and capabilities.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet high command used
a mixture of human and technical intelligence denial and deception
measures to confuse the Nazi enemy. In preparing for the Stalingrad
offensive in the late fall of 1942, the movement of reserves was
masked by the careful use of camouflage and the observation ofMASKIROVKA • 15306-313 G-P.qxd 7/27/06 7:56 AM Page 153