Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

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classe, arranging the clandestine meetings between French and Rus-
sian diplomats that led to a treaty between the two countries.
Rachkovskiy’s role in providing a clandestine diplomatic channel for
his country was aped by the KGBin the 1960s and 1970s, when it
provided back channelsbetween Moscow and Bonn.

RADIO GAMES.A critical ingredient in the Soviet counterintelli-
gencevictory over the Germans in World War IIwas its use of Ra-
dio igra, or “radio games” (Funkspielin German). The Soviet intel-
ligence services created fictitious German spy rings, often using
captured and turned German agents who were placed in contact with
German intelligence to feed the enemy misinformation. Smershand
the NKGBran 183 operations involving fictitious agents, many of
whom deceived German intelligence and operational staffs at key
moments of the war.
In the most famous game, codenamed “Monastery,” the Soviets
allowed their principal agent, Aleksandr Demyanov, to be captured
and then recruited by the German military intelligence, who then
parachuted him into Soviet occupied territory to act as their agent.
Demyanov, under Soviet control and operating with the alias “Max,”
then created a fictional political resistance movement in Moscow
and provided the German armed forces with false and misleading in-
formation for years. At critical moments before the battles of Stalin-
grad, Kursk, and the June 1944 Red Army offensive in Byelorussia,
Monastery provided misleading “feed” material generated by the
Soviet general staff as part of strategic deception. German military
intelligence never realized that it had been deceived. In books writ-
ten by German military intelligence veterans after the war, “Max” is
cited as an important and verified source.
Moscow began another radio game in the summer of 1944 to con-
vince German intelligence that a major Wehrmachtcommand, under
Colonel Scherhorn, had survived the Soviet offensive and was oper-
ating independently in the forests of eastern Poland. Scherhorn had
been recruited by Smershafter his capture and convincingly played
the role, pleading for assistance from Berlin. Demyanov (Max) was
then used by Moscow to confirm the force’s existence and resistance.
Berlin believed this information and in the course of the war dropped
13 radio sets, 225 cargo packs, and 25 German staff officers to aid

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