RAZVEDKA.The Russian word razvedkais often translated as “intel-
ligence.” A more correct translation would be “reconnaissance.”RED ORCHESTRA.Shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet
Union, German radio counterintelligencepicked up a number of So-
viet intelligence stations broadcasting from occupied Europe and
Germany itself. Noting how the stations seemed to respond to a di-
rector, the Germans called the network the Rote Kappelleor Red Or-
chestra. This network of spies in Nazi-occupied Europe was organ-
ized and run by GRU illegal Leopold Trepperfrom 1938 to 1942.
Trepper managed a series of espionage rings, which had been cob-
bled together by the GRU and the NKVDin the 1930s. In Germany,
the agents included Harro Schulze-Boysen, an air force intelligence
officer, and Arvid von Harnack, a senior economist in the German
government, and a host of socially highly placed German citizens.
When shown the first evidence of the Red Orchestra’s work, Adolf
Hitler was supposed to have said that Germany was superior to Rus-
sia in everything except espionage.
More than a hundred ideologically motivated agents and a support
staff collected critical military, political, and economic information
on the Nazi war machine in Belgium (17 agents), France (35),
Switzerland (17), and Germany (48). Prior to the Nazi invasion of the
Soviet Union, the Red Orchestra provided dramatic evidence of
Hitler’s plans. Joseph Stalinignored the warnings. During the first
year of the Nazi–Soviet war, the Red Orchestra provided the Red
Army general staff with important information about German plans
and military industrial production. One report in early 1942 dealt
with the movement of German fighters from France to bases sup-
porting Army Group Center. Others dealt with production problems
in German industry. Sandor Rado, operating from neutral Switzer-
land, commanded one of the important branches of the Red Orches-
tra and possessed some impeccable sources of information. Operat-
ing from Switzerland, this small organization had less to fear from
Nazi counterintelligence.
German counterintelligence uncovered networks in Nazi-occupied
Europe and Germany in early 1942. In Berlin the fall of the organi-
zation was swift, since many of the spies were friends or lovers and
had participated together in Communist Party operations in the216 •RAZVEDKA06-313 P-Z.qxd 7/27/06 7:57 AM Page 216