RUSSO–JAPANESE WAR (1904–1905). What started as a “glorious
little war” to win support for the tsarist regime ended in catastrophic
defeat that almost spelled the end of the House of Romanov. The
Russian military intelligence service and the Okhranawere poorly
prepared for war. The Okhranawas unable to counter Japanese intel-
ligence operations in Moscow and St. Petersburg or in Manchuria.
The military intelligence department of the general staff had only a
very poor understanding of the Japanese enemy, of whom they were
totally contemptuous. The best examples of military intelligence in-
competence were their failures to foresee the Japanese attack on Port
Arthur and the imperial fleet’s doom at Tsushima.
The Japanese fleet struck Port Arthur, China, catching the Russian
navy unaware and unprepared. Japanese spies inside Port Arthur ap-
parently produced excellent order of battle information on the Rus-
sian forces. The Japanese specialized in recruiting low-level employ-
ees and servants who could provide intelligence about the military.
When the fleet left the Baltic to relieve the garrison at Port Arthur, it
had been given no information about the Japanese order of battle. The
fleet got into its first action with a group of British fishing boats,
which Russian commanders believed were Japanese boats. The so-
called Battle of Dogger Bank, which caused a major diplomatic cri-
sis with Britain, resulted from the fleet’s blindness—a wonderful ex-
ample of the fog of war.
Russian intelligence poorly prepared the tsarist commanders for
war in Asia. With little real knowledge of the Japanese navy or army,
it lacked basic data about Japanese military units or warships. Mili-
tary counterintelligencewas weak as well. In contrast, the Japanese
had agents within the Russian base at Port Arthur, who provided crit-
ical intelligence for the Japanese surprise attack that began the war.
Inside the Russian empire, Japanese agents monitored developments
though such mundane means as reading the Russian press. They also
liaisoned with other military attachésto initiate contacts with revo-
lutionaries such as Father Georgi Gapon. The Japanese were willing
to support violence by revolutionary parties to force St. Petersburg to
divert troops from the front to quell internal revolution. The
Okhrana’s dogged interest in the subversion of the domestic enemy
blinded it to the greater threat from Japan. See alsoREVOLUTION
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