Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

War scares may have deceived the Soviet leadership as well, cre-

ating a “wilderness of mirrors” where it was impossible to understand

the adversary’s strategy or intent. Certainly, Andropov believed much

of the inflated intelligence that he demanded the KGB and the GRU

collect in the early 1980s. In the end, the final war scare may have

had the Soviet leadership as its victim.

WARNINGS.One of the key weapons of the KGB’s battle against

dissidentswas the “prophylactic warning.” In 1967–1975, more

than 130,000 Soviet citizens were called into the KGB’s offices and

warned. The warning may have revolved around an unauthorized

meeting with a foreigner, possession of a banned book, or atten-

dance at an unregistered church. Warnings were often conducted by

the KGB’s Fifth Directorate. Warnings occasionally led to expul-

sion from a school, loss of a job, removal from an apartment, or

even arrest. Warnings also allowed the security service to keep its

finger on the pulse of public opinion. According to memoirs writ-

ten by dissidents, the KGB often used the meetings as an opportu-

nity to recruit informers.

WEISBAND, WILLIAM (1908–1961).The son of Russian émigrés,

Weisband worked in American military signals intelligenceduring

World War II as a translator. He was also an NKVDagent, recruited

before the war, and he served Moscow as a penetration of the U.S.

Army Security Agency. In 1947 he informed his Soviet controllers of

the Venonaprogram. This critical information alerted Moscow that

some of its top secret messages from the previous decade had been

deciphered by the United States and that its spy rings had been com-

promised. Despite the fact that he was identified in Venona messages

as an agent with the Soviet code name of “Link,” Weisband was

never prosecuted for espionage. He was convicted of contempt for re-

fusing to answer questions before a federal grand jury in California

and served a year in jail. He died of a heart attack in 1961.

WENNERSTROM, STIG (1907–2006). One of the GRU’s signal

successes in the Cold Warwas the recruitment of Colonel Stig Wen-

nerstrom, a Swedish military intelligence officer who served in

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