Stalin read analysis of American weapons systems with far greater
interest. As a result of analytical reporting in 1942 and 1943 con-
cerning the Anglo-American nuclear weapons program by the
NKVD and the GRU, he authorized scarce resources for a Soviet nu-
clear bomb. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin asked for
reporting on U.S. nuclear developments, which the Soviets code-
named Enormoz.
The KGBhad a small analytic service compared to the Directorate
of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. Political informa-
tion was sent to the Communist Party’s Central Committee for ac-
tion. According to former Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats,
senior KGB officers were warned by the political leadership not to
present their analysis of current issues—that was the responsibility of
the Communist Party. The KGB did have a major center of scientific
and technological analysis, which allowed them to work closely with
the Soviet military industries. Important material was moved quickly
from the intelligence service to the military industrial complex to en-
hance the construction of Soviet weapon systems.
The GRU had an analytical component responsible for preparing
daily analytical reports for the minister of defense and the chief of the
general staff. The GRU also prepared detailed analytical reports on
the troops and weapons systems of adversaries. Intelligence was in-
tegrated into military decision making, and the chief of the GRU also
served as deputy chief of the Red Army General Staff.ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH (1914–1984).The most
important post-Stalinchief of the KGB, Andropov rose quickly in
the ranks of the Communist Partyduring the years of purges. Dur-
ing World War II, he worked with partisanson the Finnish front
and continued his rise in the party apparatus. In 1954 Andropov was
appointed Soviet ambassador to Hungary and cleverly managed his
embassy during the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Andropov, ac-
cording to both Soviet and Hungarian sources, manipulated Hun-
garian revolutionary leaders, repeatedly deceiving them as to
Moscow’s intentions. The Hungarian revolution had a profound ef-
fect on the rest of his life: Andropov’s wife suffered a nervous
breakdown after the fighting, from which she apparently never fully
recovered. The violence and its impact on his personal life appar-10 •ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH (1914–1984)06-313 A-G.qxd 7/27/06 7:54 AM Page 10