many intelligence officers thought was disastrous. According to a
KGB general, at one briefing on foreign intelligence, Andropov’s
sole criticism was on the cleanliness of the facilities. Andropov, ac-
cording to reports from defectorsand published documents, increas-
ingly adopted a more conservative and neo-Stalinist ideology during
the 1970s and 1980s, blaming the West and Western intelligence ser-
vices for much of what was wrong with the Soviet Union. Under the
RYaNprogram, he pushed for evidence of an American surprise nu-
clear attack, prompting a major crisis in 1983. Nevertheless, under
his leadership the foreign intelligence component expanded, becom-
ing a worldwide intelligence service.
In 1981–1982, Andropov used the KGB to discredit Communist
Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who was in physical and
mental decline. Articles were planted in the foreign press citing
Brezhnev’s senility and corruption within his family. The campaign
worked, weakening Brezhnev’s control. In the spring of 1982, An-
dropov was appointed to the secretariat of the Central Committee as
Brezhnev’s de facto successor. In November 1982, following Brezh-
nev’s death, he reached the pinnacle of political power as the Com-
munist Party general secretary.
Andropov sought to reform the Soviet Union, prosecuting dissidents
and corrupt leaders with tremendous ferocity. In the wake of threat-
ened exposure and arrest, the head of the Soviet police and his wife
committed suicide, and many senior leaders found themselves retired,
in disgrace, or in jail. Andropov used the KGB to break the Uzbek
Cotton Scandal, the largest criminal case in Soviet history, but Soviet
society by 1984 was not to be motivated or frightened into change.
Andropov was a complex figure. He did not enjoy the physical de-
struction of enemies like Lavrenty Beria. In 1973 he visited the dis-
sident Leonid Krasin in prison and promised him a light sentence if
he would cooperate. Andropov sought to promote younger and more
idealistic cadres in the Communist Party and the KGB. He was a
good judge of talent, raising Mikhail Gorbachevfrom the provinces
to the Politburo. Andropov died of kidney disease after only 14
months as national and party leader, and within a year power passed
to Gorbachev.
To Russian intelligence and security officers, Andropov was a
modern Feliks Dzerzhinsky—an honest, hard-working, and party-12 •ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH (1914–1984)06-313 A-G.qxd 7/27/06 7:54 AM Page 12