and 19 bridges, and 12,000 antitank and 8,000 antipersonnel mines
were planted in front of the attacking enemy. The NKVD also re-
cruited assassins to kill German leaders, should the city fall and
Adolf Hitler and his entourage visit Moscow. Among those recruited
were leading artistic performers in Moscow and such émigrésas
Olga Chekhova, a Russian movie actress living in Berlin who had
access to Hitler.
Soviet foreign intelligence also played a critical role in defeating
the German army before Moscow. Information from Richard Sorge
that the Japanese did not intend to enter the war convinced Stalin to
shift elite formations from Siberia to take part in a massive coun-
teroffensive. GRUand NKVD sources in Europe provided detailed
information about German forces, as well as intelligence about Ger-
man military planning.
While German troops reached the outskirts of Moscow, Soviet re-
sistance stiffened and stopped their advance by the end of November.
The following month, a massive Red Army offensive drove the
Wehrmacht back hundreds of kilometers and destroyed scores of elite
units. Never again was Hitler able to command a nationwide offen-
sive. The Battle of Moscow was the NKVD’s finest hour; in the wake
of victory, 24 members of OMSBON were made Heroes of the So-
viet Union. The unit continued its activities in the enemy’s rear
throughout the war, infiltrating 212 guerrilla units and involving
more than 7,000 of its own officers and personnel. It is credited with
killing or capturing 137,000 German officers and soldiers, including
87 senior officers, in the course of the war.BATTLE ORGANIZATION.The Boevaya organizatsiya, or Battle
Organization, was the central terrorist organization of the Socialist
Revolutionary Party (SR). It was responsible for scores of assassi-
nations between 1902 and 1908, including two ministers of internal
affairs and members of the royal family. The organization was re-
peatedly penetrated by agents of the Okhranabut remained a for-
midable force until 1908, when a radical journalist revealed that its
chief, Yevno Azev, was an informer for the Okhrana. The SR con-
tinued to see terror as a weapon in the struggle against autocracy.
Unlike the Bolshevik Party, however, the SR never developed a
central apparatus to use terror effectively. After the Revolution of24 •BATTLE ORGANIZATION06-313 A-G.qxd 7/27/06 7:55 AM Page 24