tween 2,000 and 3,000 staff officers in East Germany. The reziden-
turain the Karlshorstdistrict of East Berlin had a staff of 350 intel-
ligence officers, the largest Soviet intelligence agency outside the So-
viet Union. Two KGB components maintained an important presence
in Karlshorst: the First (Foreign Intelligence) and Third (Military
Counterintelligence) Chief Directorates. From Karlshorst, the KGB
worked very closely with the East German Stasi, which had a large
stable of agents in West Germany.
Soviet intelligence objectives in Berlin were to ensure the security
of the East German regime and the Group of Soviet Forces Germany
(GSFG), penetrate the West German regime and its allies, and disrupt
Western intelligence operations. In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
the “battle for Berlin” was violent: MGBsquads kidnapped Russian
émigréand anti-Soviet German politicians. With the assignment of
Yevgeni Pitovranovin 1953 to head the Berlin rezidentura, Soviet
operations became more sophisticated.
During the struggle for Berlin, both Soviet services used Berlin as
a launching pad for illegals. In the 1950s, the Soviet services as-
signed some of their most experienced illegal support officers to
Berlin, including KGB Major General Aleksandr Korotkov. The
Third (Illegal Support) Department was the largest KGB component
at Karlshorst, responsible for producing and checking candidates and
their documents. The GRU also dispatched illegals from Berlin to
Europe and the United States.
The KGB played a critical part in Nikita Khrushchev’s decision
to build the Berlin Wall. KGB Chair Aleksandr Shelepinand his
deputy Petr Ivashutinrepeatedly warned the political leadership that
the mass defections of young, educated East Germans weakened the
regime. When Khrushchev made the decision to build the wall (code-
named “Rose”) in August 1961, he gave the KGB, the Red Army, and
the East German authorities less than 96 hours to prepare the closing
of the interzone barrier. This decision and all the preparations for the
division of Berlin were taken without any information leaking to alert
the West.
Following the building of the Berlin Wall, Karlshorst remained an
important center of Soviet intelligence activity. Soviet cooperation
with the Stasi became increasingly close, as the East German service
delivered 80 percent of all intelligence on NATO. In the last decadeBERLIN OPERATIONS •2906-313 A-G.qxd 7/27/06 7:55 AM Page 29