Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

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he retired to Princeton, New Jersey. Browder’s role as a Soviet agent
was only revealed after his death.

BUDGETS. The Soviet intelligence services never published their
budgets. The only benchmark is a statement by Leonid Shebarshin
that while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a budget of $30
billion, the KGB’s budget was only 5 million hard currency rubles,
about $8 million, at the end of the Cold War. Of course, Shebarshin’s
statement is self-serving: the budget of the entire U.S. intelligence
community—not just the CIA—was $30 billion. Moreover, most of
the U.S. intelligence budget went to Defense Department technical
programs, whereas such programs in the Soviet Union were managed
by the GRU. Still, the KGB’s power did not come from its budget: it
could requisition what it needed—personnel, money, or property—to
accomplish its missions.
The post-Soviet Russian military has certainly suffered financially.
Officers and soldiers have gone months without salaries. Ships have
rusted away at dockside, and planes have turned to unflyable relics.
The MVD(Ministry of Internal Affairs) has suffered greatly as well,
with limited funds for operations and police officers. Nevertheless,
the Russian intelligence servicesremain robust and are the largest in
the world.

BURGESS, GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY (1910–1963).A Soviet
agent and member of the Ring of Five, Burgess was recruited by an
NKVD illegalshortly after leaving Cambridge in the early 1930s. His
initial code name within the Soviet service was “Madchen” (Maiden),
a cynical comment on his sexual promiscuity. A brilliant and witty
raconteur, Burgess was an avowed homosexual who worked unsuc-
cessfully for several British bureaucracies between 1938 and 1951.
While a disaster as a member of the British governing establishment,
Burgess was an asset for the NKVD both as a recruiter and an agent
in place, providing detailed information about personalities and poli-
cies. Burgess brought a number of prospective agents to the attention
of Soviet case officers, including Anthony Blunt.
Burgess provided the Soviets with access to a variety of important
political and intelligence policy makers. A cynical Soviet case officer
noted in his report to Moscow that Burgess was a “cultural pederast

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