tral Mexico, displayed better intelligence sense and organized a crude
but effective secret service known as the Mexican Spy Company.TEAM A–TEAM B EXERCISE.Authorized in June 1976 during the
tenure of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)George H. W.
Bush, the exercise sought to determine whether Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) analysts over- or underestimated Soviet Union’smili-
tary capabilities. The exercise examined three different aspects of So-
viet capabilities: air defenses, missile accuracies, and strategic objec-
tives. CIAanalysts, Team A, prepared their analyses normally. Team
B, comprised of independent experts using the same information
available to CIAanalysts, drew their conclusions independently. The
two teams were required to complete their analyses by early Decem-
ber 1976, to enable National Intelligence Estimate(NIE) 11-3/8, on
Soviet military capabilities, to reflect the outcome of the exercise.
The two teams worked separately of each other, but on meeting in
October, it became clear that the same data set had yielded substan-
tially different conclusions. Team Aforesaw a mild increase in Soviet
defense spending, whereas Team B estimated a much larger increase
in military expenditures. Team B believed Soviet missiles to be much
more accurate than did Team A. On the subject of Soviet air defenses,
there was general agreement that the Soviets did not possess the abil-
ity to neutralize an incoming bomber attack, although Team B felt
that the Soviets had greater ability than did Team A.
On the issue of Soviet strategic objectives, Team Asteadfastly be-
lieved that the Soviets did not seek nuclear superiority, but rather only
nuclear parity with the United States. Team B, on the other hand, esti-
mated that the Soviet Union sought nuclear superiority, not parity, and
that Moscow not only believed that it could win a nuclear war, it was
preparing for such a war. In a coordinationmeeting between the two
teams in December, Team Agave in virtually to all of Team B’s views.
The exercise demonstrated that the CIA’s analytic methodologies
needed reevaluation. It showed that relying on a single point of view
produced faulty estimates and that good estimation could only be the re-
sult of considering and addressing all views. The exercise also pointed
to the necessity of not only interpreting Soviet capabilities but also its
intentions. Consequently, the CIArevised its methodological practices,
incorporating the suggestion that the final estimative product be theTEAM A-TEAM B EXERCISE• 19905-398 (2) Dictionary.qxd 10/20/05 6:27 AM Page 199