Bibliography
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INTRODUCTION
Popular perception to the contrary, a vast body of literature on or about U.S. in-
telligence is available to those who want to delve into its complexities and myr-
iad manifestations. This is so because the United States is one of the few coun-
tries on the globe that allows—in fact, at times encourages—the public to
discuss and debate American intelligence activities. Admittedly, this perspec-
tive is a recent one, dating only to the 1980s, but the generally permissive en-
vironment in the United States has found expression in excellent works on all
periods in the history of American intelligence.
While “openness” is now a general principle of American intelligence, there
are limits to what can be disclosed without jeopardizing the country’s security.
Most works about American intelligence tend to be general in nature. Because
intelligence activities take place within a legally sanctioned culture of secrecy,
there are fewer works on specific intelligence operations. This gap is beginning
to close as intelligence agencies continue to declassify greater number of doc-
uments as part of their historical review programs. However, some national se-
curity secrets will never see the light of day, either as declassified materials or
as grist in books and journal articles.
The United States still maintains secrecy over a substantial number of intel-
ligence operations, some dating back to World War I. There are good reasons
for doing so, although some scholars allege that the American government has
a penchant for overclassification. One reason for maintaining secrecy is that the
information in question may, if revealed, embarrass governments that cooper-
ated with the United States on specific secret actions. Most governments are
very sensitive about their historical recollections, even if they date back a hun-
dred years. However, the main reason the United States classifies information
is to “protect sources and methods.” Any information that compromises a spe-
cific intelligence gathering methodology or a person serving as a source of in-
telligence information must be protected from disclosure. Not doing so would
bring into question the entire raison d’etre of the intelligence enterprise.
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