Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence

leaders, analyze that information to make it relevant and actionable,

and disseminate “finished” intelligence information in usable form to

policymakers. This suggests several functional aspects of intelligence.

First, intelligence seeks to identify threats, gather information about

the plans and capabilities of adversaries, and assess their intentions to-

ward the United States. In so doing, intelligence fulfills the role of a

safety valve, providing information to decision makers that would re-

duce their informational gaps and levels of uncertainty. Second, intelli-

gence is employed to protect secrets by identifying those who want to

uncover them, steal them, or put them in jeopardy. This counterintelli-

gence function has both defensive and offensive components to it, in-

volving everything from physical and personnel security to counterespi-

onage against foreign agents or Americans working for foreign

governments against the United States. Third, some American intelli-

gence activities involve implementing elements of the president’s for-

eign policy. Covert action—special activities, from a legal standpoint—

employs intelligence resources to influence events and behaviors abroad

for legitimate national security reasons in ways that mask the involve-

ment of the United States government.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The principal tasks of intelligence, however, are the gathering, processing,

and analysis of intelligence information and the production of intelligence

materials that meet policymaker needs. This suggests an intelligence

process comprised of several steps, normally referred to as the “intelli-

gence cycle”: a cycle of identifying needs; collecting information based on

those needs; subjecting the information to analysis; producing finished in-

telligence based on such analysis; and disseminating the analysis to polit-

ical leaders, who may then identify additional needs that start the cycle all

over again.

The first stage—setting the requirements and priorities and providing

direction—is the point where decision makers express their “needs” and

relay the “tasking” to the intelligence agencies. This presumes that de-

cision makers know what it is they need and can communicate their re-

quirements effectively, both of which are faulty assumptions. Intelli-

gence professionals frequently find themselves in the position of having

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