to identify gaps in intelligence for political leaders and relate that infor-
mation to decision makers, a very sensitive issue given that intelligence
officers work for politicians and are reluctant, like their bosses, to ad-
mit a lack of knowledge.
Indeed, the awkward relationship between policymakers and intelli-
gence officials raises questions about politicization of intelligence. In-
telligence professionals in the United States like to portray themselves
as objective arbiters of information and as disinterested participants in
the policy process. Yet, organizational arrangements, even informal
ones like the policy-intelligence relationship, surely exert pressure on
intelligence analysts to toe the political line in ways that may jeopard-
ize their policy neutrality.
Collecting and processing intelligence information—the second step
in the cycle—is no easy task. Collecting intelligence is subject to several
intangible factors, such as whether the information exists in identifiable
form in the first place and whether it can be accessed in a reasonably
cost-effective way. Gathering intelligence spans a variety of collection
disciplines—such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence
(IMINT), and human intelligence—and is subject to institutional and
budgetary considerations. Acquisition of intelligence is also highly sen-
sitive to political and technological constraints. Even if the information
is collected, it may not be the right information and therefore may not di-
rectly address the issues formulated in the requirements process. Tech-
nological and human constraints may even thwart the gathering of infor-
mation on a particular issue altogether. Worse still, there may be policy
questions, which have no answers. Former director of central intelli-
gence (DCI) Robert M. Gates once claimed that there are secrets and
there are mysteries; secrets can be acquired by using intelligence meth-
ods, but mysteries simply defy collection, analysis, and explanation.
The third stage of the cycle—analysis—is the point at which the gath-
ered and processed information goes through rigorous evaluation and
analysis. Without analysis, raw intelligence stands on its own, outside its
context, and with little relevance. Information that has not been analyzed
may also be misinterpreted and misused. Some policymakers prefer to do
their own analysis. Undoubtedly, policymakers possess substantial ana-
lytic capabilities, but there is a critical difference—policymakers perform
analysis within the context of their political world and their policy pref-
erences, which may skew and bias their evaluations. Intelligence analystsINTRODUCTION• xxxix05-398 (1) FM.qxd 10/20/05 6:14 AM Page xxxix