are better placed objectively to evaluate raw intelligence. Analysts them-
selves often are subject to political pressures—after all, the intelligence
analyst operates in a political world—but good analysts are able to extri-
cate themselves sufficiently from policy concerns and conduct their
analyses in a politically neutral environment.
Intelligence analysis leads to the next step in the intelligence cycle—
production—where intelligence information finds its way into “finished”
intelligence products. Because policymakers have their own preferences
about how they absorb information, intelligence analysts study the con-
sumption patterns of their consumers as well as the intelligence questions
they pose. Intelligence analysts also have the obligation to ensure that
their intelligence products—whether in manuscript form, oral briefings,
or video teleconferencing—are engaging enough to draw the attention of
policymakers. Above all, intelligence products must be timely, accurate,
and relevant. Policymakers may otherwise not understand or deliberately
ignore intelligence information, or even turn to other sources of informa-
tion, all of which defeat the purposes of intelligence.
Factors such as cost, time, and the availability of information certainly
affect whether intelligence serves the policy consumer well. Finished in-
telligence is relayed to the consumer on a “need to know” basis—that is,
it is disseminated, the last stage in the cycle—to answer the policymak-
ers’questions as completely and accurately as possible in a timely man-
ner. While finished intelligence usually seeks to be thorough, it may only
answer questions partially or not at all. It may also raise new questions.
The theory of the intelligence cycle suggests that these new questions
then serve as new requirements, along with new foreign policy crises,
national security threats, and other policy concerns.HISTORY
The United States government has had to deal with and address these is-
sues in varying degrees throughout its history. In fact, the United States
government engaged in intelligence activities from the inception of the
republic, but the quality of the capability has varied over time, largely
owing to the fact that Americans generally have been suspicious of such
European balance of power tactics as espionage. For much of the his-
tory of the United States, Americans rejected anything associated with
nefarious European politics, and intelligence suffered as a result.xl • INTRODUCTION05-398 (1) FM.qxd 10/20/05 6:14 AM Page xl