NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1037
(Seoul: published by Oryu Munhwasa forthe Chindan hakhoe, 1965), pp. 82-87; Franz
Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942),
pp. 39-47; Frederic Wakeman, Jr.. The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction
oj1mperial Order in Seventeenth-Cel1fllr\' China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1985), lA9-82.
- Yi Pyongdo, "Kwanghaegun iii tae Hugiim chongch'aek" [Kwanghaegun's policy
toward the LaterChinj, Kuksasanu iii chemunje 1 (March 1959): 135-73: Wakeman, Great
Enterprise 1:62-63; Inaba Iwakichi, Kl5kaikunjidai no mansei kankei [Manchurian-Korean
relations in the age of Kwanghaegun] (Keij6: 6sakaya goshoten, 1933), esp. chap. 5. - Yi T'aejin, "Chung'ang Ogunyongje iii songnip kwajong" [The process ofthe estab-
lishment of the central five division system], Han 'uuk kllnjesa (1977), pp. 88-89; Chon
Haejong, "Kado iii myongch'in e kwanhan sago" [A short study on the name, Ka Island].
Seoul taehakkyo nOllmunjip, inmun sahoe kwahak, no. 9 (1959), included in idem, Hal1-
lung Kwan 'uyesa yon 'gu [Studies in the history of Korean-Chinese relations j (Seoul:
Ilchogak, 1970), pp. 156-64; Wakeman, The Great Enterprise I: I 27.
5, Kim Yongdok has argued that in foreign policy the realism of K wanghacgun was
replaccd hy the almost mindless commitment of the WestemerChu Hsi Neo-Confucianists
to principles of moral obligation, duty, and honor. "Soh yon seja yon'gu" [A study of Crown
Prince Sohy6nj, Sahak yon'gu 18 (Sept. 1964)A36-37, - Even though the king authorized a force of only 500 men for the Howich'6ng, the
unit's commanders continued to recruit men on their own until it had grown to 1.000
men by 1624. Yi T'aejin, "Chung'ang Ogunyongje iii songnip kwajong," chap. 2 in
Han'guk kunjesa (1977), pp. 74-75; idem, ChosiJI1 hugi iii chanuch'i wa kunyongje
pyonchiln [Politics and changes in the army division system in the late Choson period]
(Seoul: Han'guk yon'guwon, 1985), pp. 81-93,98-102.
7· Yi T'aejin, Han'gllk kllnjesa (1977), p. 73: idem, Chosiin hugi, p. 84. - Yi T'aejin, Han 'Ullk kunjesa (1977), pp. 76-80; idem, Choson hugi, pp. 90-96.
- The king's 6,000 men consisted of a couple of thousand troops in the Military Train-
ing Agency, 1,000 at Changdan, 2,000 at Suwon, a mere 200 in the new Royal Division,
and 500 under the four generals of the Howich'ong (Royal Retinue Office). Yi T'aejin,
Han'uuk kunjesa (1977), pp. 79-80; idem, ChosrJn hugi, pp. 94-96. - Its men were also exempted from service on the northern frontier, in contrast to
the Military Training Agency troops, whosc musketeers in particular were often trans-
ferred to the north for duty. Yi T'aejin, Han 'gllk kUlljesa (1977), pp. 80-82; idem, Chosijn
illlgi, pp. 96-98.
I I. Yi T'aejin. Han'guk kunjesa (1977), pp. 83, 85-87; idem, Chosi'in hugi. pp. ':)8-106. - Only after the invasion did the government authorize the mobilization of 30,000
more troops from the southern provinces. Yi T'aejin, Han 'guk kUl1jesa (1977), pp. 90-91;
idem, Choson hugi, pp. 109-13. - The Noso were also rct'erred to as the Kongso (or merit-subject Westerners). One
of their leaders was Kim Yu, who favored the appointment of a member of the Small
Northerner faction, Nam Igong, to the post of censor-general in 1625. Kim was trying
to build up a base of political followers and King Injo wanted to limit the dominance of