POST-IMJIN DEVELOPMENTS 97region or southern provinces -let alone the northeast or east - to reinforce these
positions in the northwest. The fixed-position defense divided Korean forces and
left them vulnerable to the Manchu invaders who could mass their 30,ooo-man
force at will against a series of undermanned forts or walled towns. The situa-
tion called either for a reallocation of all forces for defense against the Manchus
or abandonment of the anti-Manchu foreign policy, but the situation seemed to
allow for neither and the result was a humiliating defeat.
The Second Manchu invasion
Despite the 1627 peace treaty, there was no change in the dominant pro-Ming
sentiment at the Korean court. The same bifurcation of command and strategy
that plagued the military establishment before 1627 still hindered the creation
of a unified command structure and the strengthening of the northern frontier.
These drawbacks were largely the product of politics: King Injo was too depen-
dent on the military leaders of the Restoration to assert his authority over them,
and the military commanders were divided over defensive strategy and factional
allegiance.
Men loyal to Yi Kwi and Yi So of the Young Westerners continued to favor
defense of king and capital and controlled the Namhan fort, the Defense Com-
mand stationed at the fort, the Anti-Manchu Division of Kyonggi Province, and
the Royal Division. They also had jurisdiction over 12,700 troops from five admin-
istrative districts assigned to the Namhan fort in case of emergency. Yi Kwi tried
to build up troop strength by a more thorough and accurate registration of able-
bodied males through the household tally (hop'ae) and household registration
(hojok) systems because too many registers had been burned during fighting over
the years. He also hoped to expand the network of local garrisons (chin 'gwan)
around the country (a plan favored by Yu Songnyong), but when he attempted
to strengthen the strategic town of Anju in the north, the govemment opted instead
to concentrate on the defense of the capital region.
The Young Westerners who favored this strategy included Yi So, commander
of the Anti-Manchu Command (Ch'ongyungch'ong) in Kyonggi Province and
commandant of the Namhan fortress and virtual tsar of Kyonggi Province to his
death in 1636.15 He controlled Yi Sibang, one ofYi Kwi's sons, who was defense
commander (Suosa) of the new permanent force at the Namhan fort, and the
Defense Command (Suoch'ong), and he expanded the size of the Royal Divi-
sion from 1,000 men to 6,170 by 1635, but because of the rotating duty system
only 1,560 men were called up for duty at anyone shift. and there were only
two shifts a year, of 75 days each (or 150 days per year total) during the five
months when the Yalu was frozen over. On the other hand, the Military Train-
ingAgency, also located in the capital and the only unit with full-time duty troops
supported by the state, was expanded from about 2,700 troops in 1627 to 5,000
in 1634. In brief, the build-up of the capital units were adequate for protection
of the king against domestic rebels, but they did little to improve national defenses.