ROYAL DIVISION MODEL 397chusa) had become a hereditary practice that had been incorporated into the
dynastic law code. It refused to adopt Pak So's recommendation to return land
to runaway commoners and slaves because the law already authorized sale of
the land of runaways to meet delinquent taxes, but allowed that if they returned
home, they could buy back their land and houses at a price.
As disappointing as this response was, King Hyojong's decision was even more
depressing. He rejected the proposals to repair cannon for naval vessels, switch
assignments of peasants for naval duty, and provide naval base commanders with
salaries to prevent their fleecing the naval soldiers. The only incentive he was
willing to allow for resettling runaways was reduction of the current year's per-
sonal service obligation. He did not approve returning land or homes to them,
with or without compensation to the current owners or occupants.s
Resettling runaways and vagrants was, of course, related to the fundamental
problem of maintaining troop levels up to quota, but it was next to impossible
for the king to remedy this problem. In addition to the disruption left over from
the last invasion and famine conditions, an epidemic had left the military reg-
isters filled with the names of men who had either died or run away. The law
code required registration on a triennial basis, but because of the disruption
caused by the recent invasions, King Injo had agreed in 1648 to extend the inter-
val between registration to five years. In 1653, one official reported that in
P'yong'an Province only 30,000 men were available for duty out of a quota of
70,000, and Minister of War Won Tup'yo remarked that there were only 150,000
men on the national military registers, 250,000 less than before the Imjin War
of 1592! King Hyojong was forced to postpone registration for another five years,
because of the anticipated hardship a sudden imposition of additional military
service obligations would impose on a peasant population already suffering from
famine and disease.^6
A fillip of sorts was provided to Hyojong's ambition to rearm the nation when
the Manchus requested the dispatch of a hundred Korean musketeers as rein-
forcements for the Ch'ing campaign against the Russians in Manchuria in 1654.
The creditable performance of the Korean troops in the field earned Manchu
gratitude, and their perception of trouble from the Russians enabled the Korean
court to begin open discussion of the defense of its northern frontier for the first
time since 1636. Hyojong was even emboldened to conduct a personal inspec-
tion of the troops of the Military Training Agency and the Royal Division, despite
objections from some officials fearful of Manchu retaliation.^7
Hoping to improve the sorry military situation in the provincial garrisons, King
Hyojong planned to adopt a proposal of Pak So in 1652 to restore the older sys-
tem of appointing civil district magistrates concurrent YOngjang or garrison com-
manders of specific garrisons in the provinces. After a two-year delay because
of Kim Yuk's opposition, Hyojong accepted Won Tup'yo's proposal to select able
military officials (instead of civil magistrates who had neglected their military
duties) to hold the post ofYongjang in charge of the sixteen Yong (command
centers) in the southern provinces and make the rounds of all the districts under