32 EARLY CHOSON DYNASTY
The trade with Japan consisted primarily of imports of Japanese silver, cop-
per, tin, sulphur, swords, sandalwood, alum, sugar, pepper, water buffalo horns,
Sappan wood (for medicinal use), licorice root, and elephant tusks in return for
Korean cotton cloth, rice, hemp, ramie, ginseng, floral-design pillows, sealskins,
and books. Imports, which were primarily lUXUry items, exceeded the mainly
staple exports. Trade consisted of official gifts from Japan and private trade at
the three treaty ports under strict supervision by local officials, three times a
month at the Japan House (Waegwan) until 1610, when it was increased to six
times a month.
Yu Wondong has argued that the structure of foreign trade also limited the
possibility for expanding that trade and stimulating the domestic economy. That
structure was based on a pattern of exports of necessities under coercion from
the suzerain Ming and Ch'ing emperors, and the limitation of imports to luxu-
ries sought by the Korean ruling class, rather than a full array of consumer items
for the general populace.
UNACHIEVED OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFUCIAN PROGRAM
Potential for Monarchical Despotism
The reforms carried out by the first kings of the dynasty fell far short of realiz-
ing the total program of ideologues like Chong Tojon. Before Yi Pangwon became
King T'aejong (r. 1401-18) he manipulated the succession, first placing one of
his brothers on the throne, and then inducing him to retire in his own favor. King
Sejo (r. 1455-68), of course, usurped the throne from his nephew.
The Confucian bureaucrats were not ahle to control the revenues of the king
and prevent him from treating the public exchequer as his private treasure house.
Not only did they fail to control the king's treasury, but they were unable to elim-
inate the institution of royal tribute (chinsang) by which every local commu-
nity could be assessed with a tribute levy over and above the regular local tribute
quotas to satisfy the monarch's whims for special products. Royal tribute
became one of the most onerous burdens on the peasantry because of its arbi-
trary and uncontrolled nature, and it was anathema to the Confucian purists who
objected in principle to the satisfaction of royal desires at the cost of public good.
Obstacles to Meritocracy
The highest officials were not always chosen from among the most moral or
educated of men but often they were the political and military supporters of the
rulers and were indispensable to the ruler in obtaining and maintaining control
over the government. The practice of appointing long lists of merit subjects
(kongsin) in the fifteenth century was equivalent to a Korean version ofthe spoils
system of Andrew Jackson, the granting of political position, land, and slaves