408 MILITARY REFORMalso the usurpations by commanders of capital guards like Wang Mang, Tung
Cho, Ts'ao Ts'ao, or Ssu-ma Yen of the Han and Wei. In short, thefu-ping mili-
tia system would have obviated the problems that were created by excessive cen-
tralization or decentralization of military authority,42
Yu Hyongwon was, however, somewhat more skeptical of the effectiveness
of the fu-ping system itself because it was not an exact replica of the Chou mili-
tia ideal, nor was it strictly enforced even in the reigns of Emperor Kao-tsung
(r. 649-683) and Empress Wu (r. 690-705). The troops were shifted on and off
duty without consideration of the planting and harvesting season as would be
required for a militia system, and the soldiers on guard duty absconded and hid
from the authorities. Contrary to regulations, the soldiers were not exempted
from miscellaneous labor service, and the common peasants were impoverished
by the demands of military and labor service. Furthermore, by the reign of Hsiian-
tsung (r. 7 I 3-756) the size of the army had been severely reduced.
Nonetheless, Yu shared the opinion of Ou-yang Hsiu that the Ju-ping militia
system was infinitely superior to what replaced it: long-term, professional sol-
diers (chang-tsung, changjong in Korean) established by Chang Yiieh in 723.^43
The problem with the professional soldiers was that they did not contribute to
their own expenses and had to be supported by the population. Since their num-
bers expanded (there were soon 120,000 of them), they represented an enor-
mous cost to the state and the peasant taxpayers. The source of evil, therefore,
was the destruction of militia service and the "separation of farmers from sol-
diers" in the military service system.^44
Sung Military Organization
Yu wasted little space in describing the Sung system of military organization
other than to list briefly the three types of troops in that period.^45 Yu omitted
from his account what must have been common knowledge, that the Northern
Sung government (founded 960) sought to prevent the recurrence of the mili-
tary power of the late T'ang military governors by rotating commanders and con-
centrating the largest military force in the capital, where it could be controlled
from the center. Unfortunately, these measures probably contributed to weak-
ening the defensive posture of the country somewhat in the face of the aggres-
sive attacks by the Khitan and lurchen people in the northeast. The Northern
Sung lost North China in 1126, and eventually was completely overrun by the
Mongols in 1282.
Yu used as his chief source on the military problems of the Sung the opinions
of the famous eleventh-century Sung poet and official, Su Shih, a protege of
Ou-yang Hsiu and opponent of the "new laws" of Wang An-shih. Su felt the jil-
ping militia system was superior to both the Han and Sung military systems
because it was economical and would have effectively prevented the concen-
tration of power in large garrisons or armies. Su complained about the heavy
costs associated with a professional standing army of several hundred thousand