412 MILITARY REFORM
tary service). Modem scholars have pointed out, however, that the seventeen-
kyci/ ch6kch6ng could not have qualified as the equivalent of an equal-field type
of land grant for all peasants because there was not enough land in the country
to supply such a large allotment to all adult males. It must have been a land grant
(or prebend) conferred only on duty soldiers. Its resemblance to afu-ping sys-
tem, therefore, would be restricted to the rotation of these men between their
duty posts and their farms, not the requirements that all adult males were mili-
tiamen, nor that every militiaman was guaranteed a state land grant.5^7
Kongmin gave a Koryo twist to the measure by stating that the military house-
holds (kunho) who were to receive the seventeen-ky61 grant were to be estab-
lished by hereditary succession (yon'ip), "and if [their land grants] were taken
away by force by anyone else, they will be permitted to report it to the author-
ities who will give it back to them."5^8 What this shows is that Kongmin's con-
ception of the T'ang and early Koryo systems consisted of a grant of land to a
soldier, to be inherited by his male successors (preferentially by primogeniture)
along with his military service obligation. Although male heirs of equal-field
peasants in the T'ang system might have been eligible to take over their father's
land grant, the land grant was defined as a returnable grant to peasants, not sol-
diers. Since Yu Hyongwon raised no objection here, it is likely that he accepted
the notion of hereditary land grants to "soldier families" as part of the T'ang
equal-field system when in fact it was a distinct feature of early Koryo society
marked by stronger tendencies toward hereditary aristocracy and status than in
T'ang China.
King Kongmin also reiterated the lesson learned from Chinese history about
the costly burden of permanent soldiers. He complained that in his own time
the large number of soldiers and officers guarding the palace imposed a heavy
fiscal burden on the country. Finally, despite his concern to recreate a militia,
he was unwilling to allow men of low status to infiltrate the command structure.
"Thus, the system of our forefathers has become an empty thing and the
resources of the country are wasted on salaries [of a permanent standing army].
The men who consume the salaries of the five officers in charge of the forty-
two battalions [tobu] ... are either young and weak youths or artisans, slaves
and underlings. How could this have been the intention of our forefathers?,,59
Ill's Admirationfor the Militia ModelYu omitted any serious discussion of the 250-year history of his own dynasty
in presenting the history of military systems in Korean history; he discussed
the weaknesses of the contemporary system mainly in the context of discussing
issues for reform. The main point of his background discussion was to gather
description and opinion on the militia model ofthe Chou and itsfu-ping approx-
imation in the T'ang dynasty to illustrate their superiority over long-term, pro-
fessional soldiers. Having established the decline from perfection since the
abandonment of the militia system in both countries, he obviously felt that it