498 MILITARY REFORM
The benefits of rate reduction (i.e., getting two support taxpayers to find a
third to reduce their rate from three to two p 'il per person, in the 1660s and after)
were, however, offset by raising the standard bolt of cloth from six sungp'o to
nine, equivalent to a cash raise from five to seven yang (40 percent). Rate reduc-
tion to two p 'il by itself did not eliminate rate variation because of the contin-
uing practice of illicit recruitment of men at the one-p'il rate by individual
officials. In r689, Sukchong prohibited direct recruitment (chikchOng) by offi-
cials of men for extra-quota, low-rate service (aeg'oe samosok), but his order
was probably not followed strictly since other investigations were conducted in
1695 and r 699 to reduce the IO,OOO men then registered for extra-quota ser-
vice.^43 Sukchong's order probably had the effect of raising rates by cancelling
much of the low one-p'il rate service.
The significance of the development of this low-rate system of taxation to attract
support taxpayers into affiliation with certain units was to drive the de facto rate
down and decrease the total revenue that the state as a whole might expect. It
also made Yu Hy6ngw{m's proposal for a reduction of the tax rate from three to
two p 'il per taxpayer a totally unrealistic rate because it actually represented a
tax increase, not a reduction.CONCLUSIONThe Chason government was not particularly successful in solving the problem
of finance for its military establishment, but the discussion in government cir-
cles over various plans for reform provides an interesting basis of comparison
with Yu Hy6ngwon's scheme to introduce a more equitable and efficient system
of finance. Both Yu and the practical reformers in office were convinced that
something had to be done to reduce the number of men exempted from either
service or payment of the military support tax, whether they were yangban, rel-
atives of yang ban, or commoners.
The most significant difference between Yu and the active officials, however,
was that Yu wanted to retain the existing system of support taxpayers assigned
to rotating duty soldiers, while some of the reformers in government service
like Yi Samyong boldly insisted on a more flexible approach of utilizing other
objects of taxation beyond adult male support taxpayers tied to duty soldiers.
By imposing a uniform tax on all households no matter what the status of the
head of the household, Yi argued that sufficient revenue could be raised to sup-
port the national armed forces, and that the distribution of taxes among the pop-
ulation would be far fairer (though not perfectly equal on all households) than
thc status quo. The key to its success would have been the expansion of the tax
base by including yang ban relatives and tax shirkers, adding them to the pool
of taxpayers, and using the tax receipts to support duty soldiers without neces-
sarily enrolling them for military service.
Eight of fourteen officials who expressed clear views during the debate of 1682
favored the measure, as did King Sukchong. which indicated that an influential