MILITARY REORGANIZATION 509
that the capital guards wcre to be filled only by peasants living in the Kyonggi
area around the capital, and the soldiers of the provinces would serve in gar-
risons closest to their homes. The boundaries of the nation were, of course, the
first line of defense, and in view of the two Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1637,
the Yalu River area was obviously the area of greatest concern. Yu helieved it
was much better to move people to frontiers and settle them there permanently
to provide a defensive force against invaders rather than move large central or
capital armies from the interior to the border only when invasions occurred. He
cited the testimony of a number of Chinese statesmen and generals to justify
the adoption of this plan for Korea.
Ch'ao Ts'o of the Former Han, in advocating this policy in the mid-second
century B.C. as a defense against the Hu barbarians, argued that permanent res-
idents would be familiar with the terrain and would fight to the death against
the Hu barbarians to save their families and relatives. Lu Chih of the late eighth-
century T'ang period complained that troops sent from mid-China to the remote
frontier were unhappy and lonely; only those born on the frontier would fight
willingly. 20
Since soldiers in the provinces would be serving in units closest to their homes,
it was necessary to improve the organization, location. and disposition of
provincial forces, and spell out in detail the assignments and responsibilities of
each level of provincial defense, from the village and district to the larger mil-
itary bases and garrisons. Yu noted that in his own time many of the provincial
army commanders· headquarters were located on the pcriphery of provincial
territory rather than in a central district town. Probably for this reason, the com-
manders served on temporary duty without their families. Yu wanted to relocate
the sites of the headquarters and lengthen the tour of duty allowing dependents
to live with the commander. He also complained that the coastal garrisons were
simply scattered around without relation to topography or strategic planning,
that some were too far inland or in remote places, and should be relocated near
populated areas.
Furthermore, as a late fourteenth-century governor of Ch611a Province, Chon
Noksaeng, had once pointed out, eighteen special bases had been established
in the province as a consequence of Wak6 raids, but the garrison commanders
tended to act as independent satraps, recruiting men as soldiers on their own
and then using them for personal gain. The garrison commanders became self-
appointed tax collectors and their soldiers were their agents. The Inhogun spe-
cial forces raised at that time to resist the pirates ended up as oppressors of the
people. Chon asked that the bases be abolished.
Yu remarked that a similar situation prevailed in his own time. Even though
the garrison commanders (chinjang) could not be totally abolished, the garrisons
could be put under the jurisdiction of the district magistrates. He also proposed
eliminating superfluous garrisons, relocating the remainder. and putting their
commanders on long-term duty with their families. This reform would reduce
arbitrary taxation and rationalize strategic defense?'