554 MILITARY REFORMgrain loan funds to fund state-tenancy one could convert a source of one evil
into a cure for another. Of the 1,540,000 sam of grain loan funds in P'yong'an
and over 2,000,000 sam in Kyongsang provinces, he proposed allocating 500,000
sam in each province, convertible to cash at one yang/slJm to provide a cash fund
of one million yang to finance the purchase of land. The estimated annual rental
income from the lease of this land would be 120,628 yang of cash (12 percent
return on invested capital) which would be distributed to the specific military
headquarters of governors and provincial army and navy commanders in every
province. This income would offset the 110,628 yang revenue reduction from
a tax cut, and during a three-year transition period until rental income flowed
into government coffers, interest on grain-loan funds from the provincial gov-
ernment offices in Ch'ungch'6ng and Ch611a could be used to finance military
costs. In addition, budget balancing could be aided by reducing expenditures or
by transferring cash from other sources.
He countered any possible objection to cannibalizing grain loan funds and
eliminating the current source of rural credit and relief by arguing that the peas-
ants would benefit more from obtaining land as state tenants than obtaining loans
under current conditions. He defended the use of land for supporting soldiers
because of the precedent of military colony lands (tunjon), an argument that Yu
(along with many others) had made. And he also justified the use of nonagri-
cultural production by citing the unsuccessful recommendations of the late Yi
Minso and Min Chinwon. who had previously advocated using fish, salt, and
mining income exclusively for support of the military.
He then turned to the question of military organization. At the beginning of
the dynasty when the Five Guard system was in use, the system was good, but
the troops themselves were not so good, which is why it was necessary to cre-
ate new military divisions during and after the Imjin War. Then the situation
changed to one in which the troops were in good condition but the system had
deteriorated. He said he would rather have good troops than a good system, but
the Five Military Divisions of the post- 1592 era was a bad system because their
support was not grounded in peasant production like the farmer/soldier militia
(of antiquity) hut relied instead on onerous taxes collected from peasants of good
status (yangmin) a curious remark from a disciple ofYu since Yu had favored
retention of the support taxpayer system of military finance (and hoped even-
tually to convert all slaves to men of good status).
Yu Hyongwon had only wanted to retain a reorganized Military Training
Agency without permanent soldiers but otherwise replace the rest of the Five
Military Divisions with the Five Guards. Kwon did not advocate reestablish-
ment of the Five Guards, but he was in general agreement with Yu's preference
for support taxpayers. He did complain. however, that the main problem with
the Royal Division and Forbidden Guard Division was that their rotating duty
soldiers (hosu or household heads) had been required to pay their own support
along with their support taxpayers (poin), imposing an unbearable burden on
them. There were about 30,000 men involved in this, and he expected that a grad-